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PREFACE 
The decommissioning of nuclear power plants is an exceedingly complex 
subject. One can quickly become immersed (and lost) in the myriad technical 
details. In this paper we approach decommissioning not as a strictly techno-
logical problem but as a policy issue. We deal with technical aspects of decom-
missioning to the extent necessary to present the basic technological options 
and to highlight important policy questions. Our goal is to provide a useful 
orientation to decommissioning for those who wish to understand and deal with 
these questions.* 
The authors wrote the summary and Part IV together. Dave Aquilina wrote 
Part I with some assistance from Jane Anderson, who wrote Part II. David Rod-
bourne wrote Part III and updated the paper for publication. While we acknow-
ledge our individual efforts we wish to emphasize that we conceive of the 
paper as a single work and take joint responsibility for it. The paper was 
prepared initially in 1979 and has been updated for this publication. How-
ever, the issue continues to unfold in various governmental, research, and 
private settings. 
We owe our thanks to many people. Professors at the University of Minne-
sota, officials at Northern States Power, and staff of various federal and 
state agencies across the country graciously answered our questions and sup-
plied us with information. We acknowledge their assistance with gratitude. 
In particular, we wish to thank Dean Abrahamson and Judith Weir. 
Jane Anderson 
Dave Aquilina 
David Rodbourne 
*Please note that a glossary of technical terms is supplied at the end of 
this paper. 
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PART I 
DECOMMISSIONING AND ITS POLICY CONTEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
Decommissioning Defined 
What is decommissioning? The American National Standards Institute has 
formulated a comprehensive definition: 
Decommissioning: the planned and orderly execution of a 
program devised by a nuclear facility licensee to achieve 
a substantial and permanent improvement in the status of 
a shut-down facility. The program includes: 1) decontam-
ination of the structures and equipment, 2) removal of 
sources of radioactivity, 3) return of the site to a condi-
tion wherein it may safely be returned to unrestricted sur-
face use, and 4) maintenance under the minimum surveillance 
required for the protection of public health and safety for 
a specified time if it is shown to be technically or economi-
cally infeasible to decontaminate the site to levels accept-
able for unrestricted use.l 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the operating license of a 
nuclear power plant to 40 years, including construction time. The operating 
lifetime of a nuclear plant is determined, as is the case for all industrial 
facilities, by the engineering specifications of its structural components, 
the actual circumstances of its operation, safety requirements, and, important-
1 . .d . 2 y, economic consi erat1ons. 
A nuclear power plant must be carefully decommissioned at the end of its 
operating life because of the radioactivity accumulated in its structural com-
3 ponents. During operation, some of the neutrons produced by nuclear fission 
in the reactor core pass into the steel structures which support the nuclear 
fuel, into the coolant water which flows between the fuel rods, and into the 
steel vessel which contains both the fuel rods and the coolant water. This 
neutron bombardment makes the steel highly radioactive and causes embrittle-
ment which affects the strength of the steel reactor vessel. In addition to 
materials made radioactive by neutron bombardment (induced radiation), other 
parts of the plant not in direct contact with the fission reaction, such as 
pumps and piping systems, are contaminated with radioactive material. When a 
nuclear plant is shut down, the total build-up of radioactivity, particularly 
1 
from induced radiation but including contamination, constitutes a significant 
4 environmental and public health hazard for thousands of years. 
According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 67 connnercial nuclear 
power reactors are currently licensed for operation in the United States.5 In 
addition, one reactor is licensed for low power testing; 72 reactors are under 
construction; 15 permits for additional reactors have been issued; and 11 
construction permit applications are under review. As of February 1980, the 
total licensed connnercial reactor capacity was 155,229 MWt (megawatts thermal), 
capable of generating approximately 50,000 MWe (megawatts of electricity). 
Nuclear power generates approximately 11.5 percent of the electricity produced 
in this country,accounting for 3.6 percent of total U.S. energy consumption. 6 
Decommissioning of Other Nuclear Facilities 
Nuclear power plants are not the only nuclear facilities which must be 
decommissioned. Although this paper focuses on commercial power reactors, for 
the sake of completeness it is important to mention some of the other facili-
ties which require decommissioning--other reactors and the principal components 
of the nuclear fuel cycle. 7 
Reactors are generally considered to present the major deconnnissioning 
problems because of the large number of reactors and their vast amounts of in-
duced radioactivity. In addition to the 67 commercial power reactors in this 
country there are currently about 325 other reactors. Of these, 150 are non-
power reactors, used primarily in research, and are much smaller than the power 
reactors used by utility companies to generate electricity. The federal govern-
ment owns about 80 nonpower reactors, and private industry and universities 
have the remainder. The military has about 175 reactors. Most of these are 
used·by the Navy to power nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. 
The nuclear fuel cycle begins with the mining of uranium ore. Twenty 
uranium mills are now licensed to refine and process mined uranium ore. In, 
the milling process, the ore is crushed and wet ground into a slurry. After 
the uranium is extracted from the slurry, the waste slurry, containing a large 
volume of finely ground solids, is transferred to a tailings pond. There the 
solids, called mill tailings, settle into a pile. The milling process in the 
United States annually generates 10 to 15 million tons of tailings. 8 
The radioactivity of mill tailings is lower than that produced at other 
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The level of radioactivity is equal to the 
2 
relatively low level natural radioactivity present in uranium ore. However, 
the tailings' long-lived radioisotopes and their physical form combine to 
create a potential public health hazard. It takes about 80,000 years for the 
thorium-230 in mill tailings, from which radon gas and radium are derived, to 
decay to one-half of its original concentration level. Natural processes and 
human activities can disperse the finely ground tailings into the environment. 
Radon gas easily escapes into the atmosphere from unstabilized tailings, and 
radium may be released into surface water through leaching by rain and surface 
runoff. In the past, tailings have been used in the construction of houses 
and other buildings. 9 
To decommission uranium mills, steps must be taken to minimize the re-
lease of radon and radium from the tailings. Two methods are feasible: 1) 
covering the tailings with certain materials to stabilize them and prevent 
erosion and radon release; and 2) burying the tailings in uranium mines or pits 
10 below ground level. Due to the long half-life of the tailings' radioactivity, 
these methods must be designed and implemented to minimize need for continued 
surveillance and to prevent natural processes or human activities from dis-
persing the tailings in the distant future. 
As of 1977, 21 commercial fuel fabrication plants were operating in the 
United States. These facilities convert natural and enriched uranium from re-
fined ores into uranium oxide. The uranium oxide is packed into tubular fuel 
rods for use in nuclear reactors. 
Normal production operations result in surface contamination of components 
in fuel fabrication plants. The low levels of radiation associated with sur-
face contamination require less complex and less expensive decommissioning 
procedures than those required for commercial power reactors. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRG) regulates the chemical decontamination and disposal 
of equipment from these plants. 11 
Fuel reprocessing plants recover uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear 
fuel in order to produce more fuel or .nuclear weapons material. The Carter 
Administration imposed a moratorium on commercial reprocessing because of its 
implications for nuclear weapons proliferation. 12 Of the three commercial re-
processing plants in the United States, the one owned by Nuclear Fuels Service 
(NFS), Inc., located in West Valley, New York, is the only one that ever 
operated. NFS ceased operations in 1972 and in 1976 closed the plant for 
economic reasons. The federal government operates four reprocessing plants, 
3 
used in weapons production. An additional five federal reprocessing facilities 
were shut down in the 1950s and 1960s and have not yet been decommissioned. 
During plant operations, large quantities of both induced radiation and 
surface contamination accumulate in reprocessing plants. Thus, unlike other 
facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing plants present decommission-
ing problems as large and complex as commercial power reactors. 
TheBattelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory estimates that after shut-down 
but prior to decontamination, a reprocessing plant would contain radiation 
levels in excess of 30 million curies and radiation exposure rates from a few 
13 thousand to 200,000 milliroentgen per hour in various parts of the plant. 
Even after chemical decontamination, the plant would contain more than 22,000 
curies of radiation, and the radiation dose to workers involved in immediate 
dismantlement of the plant would be more than 530 man-rems. Reprocessing plant 
decommissioning would create large quantities of radioactive wastes. One esti-
mated cost for completely dismantling a fuel reprocessing plant is $58 million 
(in constant 1975 dollars). 
In sum, commercial nuclear power plants constitute only part of the total 
number of reactors which must be decommissioned. In terms of reactor decom-
missioning, commercial power reactors are the most difficult because of their 
large size and long operating lifetimes. Reactors, in turn, are part of the 
range of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle which require decommissioning. 
These different facilities pose different decommissioning problems. 
Decommissioning: Framing the Issue 
Until the mid-1970s decommissioning commercial nuclear plants was not a 
priority policy issue for the utilities, the federal government, or the states. 
From the standpoint of the nuclear industry, decommissioning presented no in-
tractable technological problems, and decommissioning costs were expected to be 
low in comparison with nuclear power plant construction costs. 
What then is the issue? To understand the importance of decommissioning 
as a policy issue, it must be examined within the context of the unresolved 
questions on nuclear waste storage and the economics of nuclear power. It is 
in relation to these questions that decommissioning derives much of its signif-
icance as a public policy issue. 
4 
DECOMMISSIONING AND NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE 
Background Information 
14 Decommissioning can generate large quantities of radioactive waste. In 
order to decommission nuclear power plants, waste repositories capable of hand-
ling these wastes must be available. Thus, decommissioning represents one as-
pect of the nuclear waste storage issue. And the development of public policy 
on waste storage may significantly affect decommissioning. 
The relationship between decommissioning and broader waste storage ques-
tions is complex. The principal sources of decommissioning wastes include: 
the internal structures of the reactor core, pressure vessel, control rods, 
pipe systems, and the thermal and biological shields. The exact amount of waste 
and its radioactivity depend upon the type of reactor, its operating history 
and condition at shut-down, and the decommissioning method employed. 
It is estimated that the decommissioning of a 1144 MWe commercial nuclear 
plant will generate between 65 and 13,000 cubic yards of radioactive solid 
wastes and from 3,600 to 159,000 gallons of aqueous radioactive wastes. 15 In 
addition to these wastes, which vary in concentrations of radioactivity, decom-
missioning requires the removal of the tons of highly radioactive spent fuel 
from the plant's storage pool. This consists of 120 to 150 metric tons of 
heavy metal (that is, uranium and plutonium) plus tons of radioactive cladding 
I 
and other structural materials from the fuel bundles and assemblies. 
Radioactive wastes, including those from decommissioning, consist of a 
great many materials in a variety of physical and chemical forms. The amounts 
and sources of radioactivity vary. Each kind of nuclear waste presents dis-
tinct handling and storage problems. The different kinds of wastes may be 
classified in three basic ways: 
1. Wastes may be classified according to their origin. The nuclear 
facility or process generating the waste determines its radiological 
composition and concentration levei. 16 
2. They may be classified by physical and chemical form. Nuclear wastes 
occur as solids, liquids, and gases. Since different forms require 
different processing and storage methods, this classification can be 
helpful for decommissioning studies. 
5 
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3. The radiological profile approach may be used. It details the ra-
diological composition and concentration of various wastes and then 
classifies them as high-, medium, or low-level waste. These dis-
tinctions are arbitrary and specific definitions of concentration 
levels vary. 
The federal Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG), 
established in March 1978 by President Carter to formulate nuclear waste policy 
recommendations, has defined major categories of nuclear waste which combine 
the three basic classification schemes. The IRG's five waste categories are: 
1) high-level, 2) low-level, 3) transuranic, 4) uranium mill tailings, and 
17 5) gaseous effluents. In relation to nuclear power plant decommissioning, 
high- and low-level are the significant categories and merit detailed discus-
sion. 
High Level Waste (HLW)lS 
The definition of HLW remains an open question. The Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 refers to but does not define high-level radioactive waste in as-
signing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authority over storage facili-
ties for such wastes. NRC regulations related to spent fuel reprocessing plants 
define "high-level liquid radioactive waste" as the "aqueous wastes resulting 
from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, 
and the concentrated wastes resulting from subsequent extraction cycles, or 
f f . . d. d f 1 1119 H equivalent, in a acility or reprocessing irra iate reactor ue s. ow-
ever, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 in prohib-
iting ocean dumping of "high-level radioactive wastes" defines them to include 
"irradiated reactor fuel from nuclear power reactors" (spent fuel) as well as 
reprocessing wastes. Additionally, on at least one occasion, the NRC used a 
definition of HLW that included not only reprocessing wastes but also spent 
fuel rods and transuranic contaminated wastes, and the IRG report treats spent 
fuel.as HLW. 
Designation and treatment of waste as high-level re~lects several factors: 
high, penetrating radiation; long duration; and biolo~ical toxicity. In 
essence, high-level wastes require special management and precautions because 
they present serious biological hazards over extremely long periods of time 
(measured in thousands or hundreds-of-thousands of years). 
6 
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Reprocessing wastes are highly radioactive, generate high levels of heat, 
and are of extremely long duration. They contain nonvolatile fission products 
and some transuranics (about one percent by weight). 20 Radiation levels of 
reprocessing wastes are measured in thousands of curies (up to 10,000 curies 
per gallon), and permanent isolation from the biosphere is essential. Tradi-
tionally, reprocessing wastes have been thought of as the primary HLW problem 
because of the expectation that spent fuel would be reprocessed to recover ur-
anium and plutonium. 
Spent fuel, in the absence of reprocessing, is also considered to be HLW 
and a major waste management problem. It contains all of the fission products 
and transuranics found in reprocessing waste plus the unused uranium and plu-
tonium that would have been recovered during reprocessing. Spent fuel emits 
high levels of radiation, generates high levels of heat, and is a very long-
lived source of radiation. Because it presents hazards comparable to repro-
cessing waste, it requires comparable handling and storage. 
Cladding hulls from spent fuel, transuranic contaminated wastes from fuel 
reprocessing and recycling, and some decommissioning wastes can also be con-
sidered HLW. Cladding hulls and transuranic contaminated wastes, although not 
intensely radioactive like spent fuel and reprocessing wastes, contain very 
long-lived radionuclides which require effective isolation from the biosphere 
for extremely long periods. 
Decommissioning a nuclear power plant by prompt dismantlement, one of the 
options discussed in Part II of this paper, requires removal of all radioactive 
components (and spent fuel) from the plant site. In particular, the irradiated 
reactor internals, control rods, and pressure vessel contain various radio-
nuclides that present radiological hazards. The amount of contaminated and 
activated steel in a commercial reactor (1,000 to 1,200 megawatts electric) 
could total as much as 800 metric tons. At shut-down after a normal operation-
al lifetime, the activated reactor components could contain nearly five million 
. f d. . 21 curies o ra iation. 
For several decades after shut-down, cobalt-60 in the irradiated steel 
of the reactor presents the predominant radiological hazard. 22 Although it 
is a source of intense radiation, cobalt-60 has a half-life of only 5.2 years 
and decays relatively quickly. Nevertheless, while this source of radiation 
is present, special handling and storage measures are required. Immediate 
dismantlement of a plant must confront this problem. Deferred dismantlement~ 
7 
another decommissioning option, tackles the problem by waiting for cobalt-60 to 
decay to less hazardous levels. 
Regardless of the decommissioning method chosen, very long-lived radio-
nuclides remain in the reactor steel and present a long term management problem. 
Nickel-59 (half-life 80,000 years) and niobium-94 (half-life 20,000 years), al-
though not sources of intense radiation like cobalt-60, persi~t for periods of 
time comparable to HLW. About 80 years after shut-down, the extremely slow 
decaying niobium-94 predominates in determining any reduction in the radiation 
dose rate. Even after thousands of years, therefore, the radiation hazard from 
the reactor vessel will still be substantially above release levels. 23 
Decommissioning studies have generally assumed that, with the exception of 
spent fuel, radioactive wastes in the form of activated and contaminated mater-
ials would be permanently disposed of by shallow land burial at low-level waste 
sites. However, although no policy decision has been made on the subject, one 
study estimated that, other than spent fuel, approximately 74 metric tons of 
activated reactor components might warrant deep geological storage like HLW. 24 
Deferring dismantlement for several decades would not solve the problem due to 
the presence of extremely long-lived radionuclides in the material. 
As of 1977 there were about 9.5 million cubic feet of reprocessing wastes, 
25 
roughly equivalent to 70.6 million gallons. Federal military and research 
programs generated almost all of it. The federal reprocessing HLW totaled 9.4 
million cubic feet (about 70 million gallons). It is stored at three Depart-
ment of Energy sites. Liquids constitute 40 percent of the federal HLW inven-
tory; most of the renmining wastes have been processed into sludge and salt 
cakes. 
This HLW in liquid and sludge form is currently stored in underground 
tanks. At the Hanford Reserve in Washington more than 500,000 gallons have 
leaked from 20 different tanks. In 1973, some 115,000 gallons seeped into the 
d f . 1 1 k . tank. 26 Th f d 1 . h . groun ram a singe ea in one e e era government is ex urning 
some of the tanks and placing the wastes into new ones. The remaining repro-
cessing waste, about 82,000 cubic feet (0.6 million gallons), is now stored in 
one tank at the Nuclear Fuels Service plant in New York. Even if accidental 
leaks are prevented, the tanks cannot contain HLW indefinitely. The volume and 
aanger of the reprocessing waste and the questionable adequacy of temporary 
storage methods underscore the importance of resolving the problem of per-
manent waste storage. 
8 
Spent fuel from commercial reactors now totals about 6,000-7,000 metric 
tons of heavy metal. By 1985 this amount could increase up to 16,800 me.tric 
tons; by the year 2000, the inventory of commercial spent fuel could reach as 
high as 97,800 metric tons depending on the rate of growth of nuclear power. 
(See Appendix B.) 
Presently there are no facilities for the permanent storage of HLW. How-
ever, several technological approaches to the HLW problem have been considered. 
They include placing HLW underground in deep, stable geological formatjons, 
burial beneath the ocean floor or in Antarctic ice sheets, and ejection jnto 
27 
space. The federal government, nuclear industry, and university researchers 
have focused their efforts on underground storage, apparently the most feasible 
method. 
To prepare reprocessing waste for storage, the liquid and sludge waste 
would first be concentrated and immobilized in glass, ceramic or a composjte 
material. The soljdified waste would then be placed in stainless steel cannis-
ters. Spent fuel would also be stored in cannisters. The cannisters would be 
placed in a vault or mine in a dry, stable geological formatjon of salt, gran-
ite or shale. 
Since the National Academy of Sciences first recommended underground stor-
age in 1957, many researchers have argued that salt would be the best medium, 
primarily because salt formations are stable and isolated from groundwater. The 
Department of Energy is experimenting with storage in a salt formadon near 
Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPF) is scheduled to 
commence operations in 1985, the original target date for the first permanent 
HLW repository. 
Many serious questions have been raised on the use of salt formations for 
28 HLW storage. Fundamentally, the nature of geology as a science is the key 
technological problem; it is principally a descriptive not a predictive science. 
Moreover, "local political attitudes now loom as large as geological criteria, 29 
in the search for an HLW storage site. An increasing number of states are 
taking action to prohibjt or restrict the location of nuclear waste repositor-
ies within their borders. 
According to the Inter agency Review Group (IRG), if salt is the chosen 
medium and a site is selected by 1982, a permanent HLW facility could be ready 
sometime between 1988 and 1992. But, if site selection is based on an assess-
9 
ment of a broader range of geological formations, permanent HLW storage could 
be delayed until 1995. 30 A recent Department of Energy estimate calls for 
opening permanent storage facilities between 1997 and 2006. 31 Due to the un-
resolved technical questions and the political volatility of siting waste 
storage facilities, the availability of permanent HLW storage by the year 2000 
is certainly open to question. 
The IRG estimates that five commercial nuclear power plants will be decom-
missioned by the year 2000. 32 To do so, a combined total of 600 to 750 metric 
tons (heavy metal) of spent fuel must be removed from the plants' storage pools. 
If the IRG timetable for permanent HLW storage facilities is not met, plant 
decommissioning could be undertaken only to a limited extent unless adequate 
offsite interim storage is available. 
Although the utilities are primarily responsible for temporary storage 
of spent fuel, the federal government plans to establish interim spent fuel 
storage at away...,.from-reactor sites (AFRs). 33 However, deconnnissioning is not 
the central problem creating the need for these facilities. In the course of 
normal operations, about one-third of a commercial reactor's fuel is replaced 
every 12 to 18 months. The spent fuel is stored temporarily in pools adjoining 
the reactor. The moratorium on connnercial reprocessing and the lack of per-
manent waste repositories are causing many of these pools to become filled. 
The Nuclear Assurance Corporation has estimated that by 1987 about 14 
operating commercial nuclear plants will run out of on-site spent fuel storage 
capacity. (See Appendix D.) Even though by the end of 1979 the NRC had issued 
47 licenses allowing utilities to store additional spent fuel assemblies in 
their on-site pools beyond original design capacity. AFRs and additional stor-
age capacity will still be necessary. 
AFRs would be large storage pools with an average capacity of 5,000 metric 
tons each. The IRG believes that the NRC could issue licenses for AFRs some-
time between 1982 and 1984, if sites for these facilities could be found. If 
the deadlines for permanent HLW storage are met, three AFRs would be required. 
"The AFR requirement roughly doubles for a three-year delay and triples for a 
delay of five years. 34 If these storage pools are built, they could handle 
the spent fuel from decommissioned·reactors and operating plants _with full on-
site storage capacity. 
10 
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Still another short term alternative is continuing spent fuel storage at 
the reactor site beyond the expiration date of the operating license. In late 
1979, the NRC commenced an assessment of the permanent safe storage problem as 
it bears on reactor licensing. Among the issues included is whether spent fuel 
storage at the reactor site can be continued safely even after the facility's 
operating license expires. The Department of Energy (DOE), designated the lead 
agency in federal waste management research, has stated that such on-site spent 
fuel storage would be safe at least until permanent storage becomes available--
estimated by DOE to be between 1997 and 2006. 35 However, one DOE official has 
testified that opening a permanent storage facility would not necessarily mean 
that a utility could immediately ship out its spent fuel. 36 
When placed in the context of the total volume of spent nuclear fuel and 
reprocessing waste, the spent fuel which must be removed from plants being de-
commissioned represents a small part of the waste storage problem. Nonethe-
less, it is important to understand that utility companies cannot fully de-
commission nuclear power plants unless they can remove the spent fuel from 
reactor sites. Further, other radioactive decommissioning wastes--whether 
those associated with the relatively short-term but intense hazard presented by 
cobalt-60 or those associated with the extremely long-lived nickel-59 and nio-
bium-94 -- may require storage measures comparable to the techniques used for 
other HLW. Thus the availability of permanent HLW storage sites and facilities 
I 
has important implications for the decommissioning of nuclear plants . 
Low Level Waste (LLW) 37 
Low level wastes have concentration levels of around one micro-curie per 
cubic foot versus the thousands of curies per cubic foot (or gallon) of HLW. 
LLW is generated at every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and in medical and 
research uses of radioactive isotopes. It consists of a great variety of con-
taminated materials such as pipe systems in reactors, laboratory instruments 
and equipment, chemical solvents used to clean surface contamination, and mis-
cellaneous trash (paper, rags, plastic items). LLW remains radioactive for 
several hundred years, considerably less time than HLW. It is disposed of by 
shallow land burial. 
While LLW is much less dangerous than HLW, the.problems of LLW management 
are considerable. As the IRG stated in its report to former President Carter: 
11 
The heterogeneity of the wastes, the extreme range of their 
physical and chemical properties, and their interaction with 
the ground ••• after disposal are, at present, sufficiently 
complex as to make it difficult to confidently gredict their 
long term behavior and their potential hazard. 3 
By the year 2000, depending on assumptions about nuclear capacity growth 
rates and waste technology, the volume of LLW from federal programs (research 
and military) could total between 38 and 190 million cubic feet. Commercial 
LLW could total 83-260 million cubic feet by that time. Commercial decommis-
sioning wastes, as estimated by the IRG for the year 2000, could be 100-200 
thousand cubic feet of LLW materia1. 39 
Approximately two million cubic feet of commercial LLW are buried annual-
ly in the United States, and that amount increases each year. Since 1962, six 
commercial burial sites have been licensed. 40 Two are permanently closed, in 
part due to leakage problems. A third has been closed since April 1978 pend-
ing license renewal. Another is open but has limited its monthly intake of 
waste to 1977 levels which will be cut by half in the near future. The last 
two remain open. If current practices continue, 275,000 cubic feet of LLW 
will be buried per acre, and by the year 2000, 301 to 945 acres could be need-
ed for commercial LLW. (See Appendix E.) 
The Department of Energy manages 14 active and 2 closed burial sites for 
federal LLW. By 2000, between 137 and 690 acres will be required for burial 
of these wastes. 
Federal studies have revealed that some of the existing burial sites are 
not adequately containing the wastes. Sowe radionuclides have migrated into 
the surrounding soil. The long term environmental and public health impacts 
are uncertain. 
Other disposal methods for LLW improvements in shallow burial technology 
and increased standardization of disposal practices are necessary. However, 
as is the case for HLW storage, the basic questions to be resolved are polit-
ical, not technical. Locating LLW disposal sites will be increasingly diffi-
cult as the need for additional sites increases. 
The main sources of LLW from decommissioning are: contaminated and acti-
vated concrete, contaminated metal from pumps, pipes, and miscellaneous equip-
ment, and processed liquid solvents from decontamination procedures. Immediate 
dismantlement of a commercial reactor could generate over 16,000 cubic meters 
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of contaminated concrete and metal as well as activated materials and spent 
fuei. 41 Contaminated concrete represents 71 percent by volume of all contam-
inated materials. 
In some respects, the LLW situation parallels the HLW considerations. 
Decommissioning nuclear power plants generates a small amount of LLW in compar-
ison with the total volume of such wastes from all sources. But the develop-
ment of LLW management policy could have an impact on decommissioning 
practices. For example, the location of LLW disposal sites will determine the 
distance decommissioning LLW will have to be shipped, which in turn will af-
fect decommissioning costs. 
Radioactive waste management and its relation to commercial nuclear power 
are evolving issues. Although decommissioning wastes may not be large in re-
lation to the overall waste problem, the availability of AFRs or permanent 
high-level waste storage facilities and of adequate low-level waste facilities 
will affect the decommissioning problem. Interim or permanent spent fuel and 
waste repositories are necessary if reactor owners are to undertake immediate 
dismantlement of nuclear power plants that cease operation in the late 1990s 
and early in the next century. If waste storage is unavailable or inadequate, 
decommissioning will be delayed or limited to partial completion. 
DECOMMISSIONING AND THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
The estimated costs for decommissioning a nuclear power plant vary accord-
ing to the type of reactor, the decommissioning method chosen and other fac-
tors. Cost estimates are as high as $129 million. (See Appendix H.) In 
comparison, today's construction costs for a large commercial nuclear power 
plant (1,00_0 megawatts) total $1-2 billion~ The cost estimates are presented 
in Part II of this paper; the financing questions in Part III. To frame these 
discussions a brief overview of nuclear power economics is useful. 
In the late 1950s the advocates of nuclear power proclaimed that elec-
tricity generated by nuclear plants would be too cheap to meter. In 1967 the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, forerunner to the NRC) estimated that the con-
struction cost per kilowatt hour capacity for nuclear plants going on-line in 
1973 would be $130, but the actual construction costs for different plants 
were 50 to 280 percent higher. In 1974 the AEC estimated the construction cost 
13 
to be $700 per kilowatt hour capacity for plants starting up in the 1980s, but 
the real costs are about $1,000 per kilowatt hour capacit;. 42 A study in late 
1979 estimated capital costs for a plant coming on-line in 1990 to be $1,670-
$1,804 per kilowatt. 43 
There are many reasons beside the general rate of inflation for the cost 
increases. By the early 1970s it took 70 percent more time to build a nuclear 
plant than had been anticipated in the 1960s; the construction and licensing 
of a nuclear plant now require a decade. The capital costs of nuclear plants 
have risen faster than those of coal-fired plants and show no signs of slowing 
down. 44 Changing federal regulations have added to construction time and to-
tal costs. And more stringent safety requirements, sure to come after the 
Three Mile Island incident, could increase costs still further. 
Whether or not electricity generated by nuclear power now holds a price 
advantage over electricity from coal-fired plants is the subject of intense 
debate. 45 After hearings in 1978, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission 
noted the wide range of views on the question of whether coal or nuclear is 
less expensive. The commission noted that among the views represented was 
the position that it was "impossible to tell." The New York Public Service 
Commission, based on its record of hearings, could find "no credible bottom 
line comparison" 46 between the generation costs for coal and nuclear. 
In the past, some estimates have shown nuclear to be less expensive than 
coal, for example 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour from nuclear versus 2 cents for 
coal. However, some people argue that such estimates understated nuclear 
costs by failing to account for the costs of waste storage, decommissioning, 
tougher federal safety standards, and tax subsidies. Whatever the case, the 
cost of nuclear power has risen dramatically. 
Escalating construction costs, uranium price increases, and stricter 
safety rules may seriously jeopardize the future economic viability of'nuclear 
power. "September 1974 was the high point for America's nuclear power indus-
try. At that time there were 239 reactors totaling more than 237,000 mega-
watts capacity either operating, under construction or on order. 1147 Since 
that time the annual growth rate of electricity demand has decreased from 7 
percent to about 3.5-4.0 percent. · This decline and rising costs have combined 
to force many utilities to cancel or defer plans for nuclear power plant 
struction. And new orders do not balance cancellations and deferrals. 48 
day only 166 reactor units are operating or in the pipeline. 49 
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According to Professor Albert Wohlstetter, University of Chicago, the 
major American manufacturers of nuclear plants in 1976 lost a total of $1.3-
$2.8 billion due to cancellations and deferrals. And the total generating 
capacity of nuclear plants in this country now forecast for the year 2000 is 
less than half the 1975 estimate and less than one-third of the 1972 fore-
cast. 50 
Thus, the economic future of nuclear power is unclear. Increasing costs 
and slower growth of demand for electricity have played a major role in the 
cancellations and deferrals of nuclear plants and in the declines in the 
nuclear sector's forecasted total generating capacity. 
Major financial institutions have begun to seriously question the eco-
nomics of nuclear power. The nation 1 s life insurance ,:ompanies, with assets 
totaling $352 billion, are a significant source of financing for electric util-
ities. In 1978 the Equitable Life Assurance Society, the third largest life 
insurance company in the United States, started "reviewing its investment 
51 practices and casting a cool eye at the nuclear sector." A December 1979 
study by a subsidiary of Basche Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. was titled "Nuclear 
Energy: Dark Outlook" and predicted "the uncertainty of costs will escalate 
to the point where nuclear plants are an unattractive financial proposition. 1152 
In sum, while the electric utilities do not trivialize decommissioning 
costs, they are confident that they caq finance them. However, given the 
uncertainty of the overall picture of nuclear power economics, any addition to 
costs, including decommissioning, must be examined carefully. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PART II 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
The possible approaches to decommissioning nuclear power plants range 
from prompt and complete dismantlement and removal of a plant from its site to 
permanent entombment of parts of a plant at its site. The nuclear literature 
describes numerous variations within this range. However, no one approach has 
gained wide acceptance as the best way to decommission a plant. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory guide on plant decom-
missioning describes four alternatives: mothballing; in-place entombment; 
removal of radioactive components and dismantling; and conversion to a new 
1 
nuclear or fossil fuel system. The first three alternatives will serve as 
the primary basis for the following discussion. However, it should be noted 
that the NRC guide is currently under review and changes in the decommission-
ing policies may result. 
The preliminary preparation of a plant for decommissioning is similar for 
each decommissioning alternative. All non-contaminated systems in the plant 
are drained of fluids. Selected radioactive components are decontaminated 
with chemical agents. The chemicals are then removed and transported to off-
1 
site storage facilities. Other materials which are removed and transported 
for storage include: all spent fuel; in-core nuclear source material; spent 
resin materials radioactive liquid; and other non-fixed radioactive mater-
ials. 
The disposition of the remaining radioactive materials and components is 
the major feature which differentiates the possible approaches to decommis-
sioning. Such factors as costs, occupational and public hazards, and land 
use are determined by what happens to the radioactive materials in the plant. 
A general description of each of the decommissioning alternatives is present-
ed here. It is important to note that the current NRC regulatory guide does 
not contain specific procedures for each decommissioning alternative. (See 
Appendix G.) Therefore, considerable variation may occur in the way two 
plants are decommissioned, even if the same alternative is used. 2 
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FOUR DECOMMISSIONING APPROACHES 
Mothballing 
The NRC regulatory guide defines mothballing as follows: 
Mothballing of a nuclear reactor facility consists of put-
ting the facility in a state of protective storage. In 
general, the facility may be left intact except that all 
fuel assemblies and the radioactive fluids and waste should 
be removed from the site. Adequate radiation monitoring, 
environmental surveillance, and appropriate scrutiny pro-
cedures should be established under a possession-only 
license to ensure that the health and safety of the public 
is not endangered. 3 
In the mothballing approach, decontamination of piping systems is per-
formed only to remove loosely adhering radioactive material which might result 
in airborne contamination ii left in place. 4 All doors and penetrations 
(ducts, lines, and hatches) from the outside into the containment, fuel, and 
other buildings are locked or sealed off. The estimated time required to moth-
ball a plant is about one year. 
The NRC regulatory guide states that physical barriers (fences, doors, 
etc.) of a mothballed plant should be inspected every three months. Further-
more, environmental surveys should be conducted every six months to ensure 
that no significant amounts of radiation are being released into the environ-
s 
ment. Depending on the extent of physical security measures, the plant may 
require 24 hour/day surveillance. 
The NRC definition of mothballing does not state how long the plant 
should remain in a state of "protective storage." However, the license obli-
gations, under what is expected to be a possession-only license, cannot be 
terminated nor the site abandoned until all radioactive materials are removed 
or the radiation has decayed to levels that meet standards permitting un-
restricted use. 
Entombment 
The NRC regulatory guide defines in-place entombment as follows: 
In-place entombment consists of sealing all the remaining 
highly radioactive or contaminated components (e.g., the 
pressure vessel and reactor internals) within a structure 
integral with the biological shield after having all fuel 
assemblies, radioactive fluids and wastes, and certain 
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selected components shipped offsite. The structure should 
provide integrity over the period of time in which signi-
ficant quantities •• ~ of radioactivity remain with the 
material in the entombment. An appropriate and continuing 
surveillance program should be established under a posses-
sion-only license.6 
Entombment provides greater physical protection than mothballing for the 
radioactive components of the plant. The piping systems are totally decontam-
inated. The reactor vessel and its components, as well as any other compo-
nents which contain significant radioactivity, are encased in a concrete iso-
lation structure within the containment building. All doors and penetrations 
leading into the reactor portion of the plant are sealed off. Entombing a 
plant is estimated to require about two years. 
Although the entombed plant does not require constant surveillance to 
prevent intrusion, inspection and environmental monitoring are necessary as 
for a mothballed plant and as required under the "possession-only" licenses 
which would detail the owner's responsibilities in lieu of the regular operat-
ing license. These requirements exist until all radioactive materials are 
removed or the radioactivity has decayed to acceptable levels. 
Dismantlement 
The NRC regulatory guide defines "removal of radioactive components and 
dismantling" as follows: 
All fuel assemblies, radioactive fluids and waste, and 
other materials having activities above accepted unrestrict-
ed activity levels ••• should be removed from the site. The 
facility owner may then have unrestricted use of the site 
with no requirement for a license. If the facility owner 
so desires, the remainder of the reactor facility may be 
dismantled and all vestiges removed and disposed of.7 
Unlike the previous two alternatives, dismantlement leaves no contami-
nated structures or equipment on the _plant site. The site and facility first 
are prepared for dismantlement. Loose contamination is removed from access 
areas; temporary structures are erected for storing equipment; and temporary 
electric service is provided. All potentially contaminated piping and assoc-
iated equipment are decontaminated. The most hazardous activity is the dis-
mantlement of the reactor internals and reactor vessel, which are the most 
highly activated and contaminated components of the plant. They constitute a 
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substantial quantity of waste which must be.cut into pieces suitable for ship-
ment. The concrete biological shield also must be broken down for shipment. 
The waste generated during this process includes filters used to trap the air-
borne contamination generated during demolition. These filters, and all other 
radioactive wastes generated during the plant dismantlement, must be removed 
d . 1 . 8 to a waste 1sposa site. 
When only non-radioactive structures and equipment remain, two alterna-
tive procedures are possible: complete removal or conversion, Complete 
removal involves the total dismantlement of all plant facilities. Non-
radioactive materials may be salvaged or demolished and used for landfill. If 
radiation surveys indicate acceptable residual levels of radioactivity, the 
license may be terminated in order to release the site for unrestricted use. 
Total dismantlement and removal of a plant is expected to take six to seven 
years. 
Conversion 
The other procedure following dismantlement of the nuclear portions of a 
plant is conversion of the facility to a new nuclear or fossil fuel generating 
system. Rather than being salvaged or demolished for landfill, the original 
turbines and other non-contaminated buildings and equipment are reused in 
conjunction with a newly installed system for supplying steam. 9 
EXPERIENCE WITH DECOMMISSIONING 
Each of these decommissioning alternatives has been used to decommission 
.research reactors, critical facilities, and small prototype power reactors in 
the United States. 10 In total, sixty-four reactor facilities and four demon-
stration power plants licensed by the NRC have been decommissioned thus far. 
The group of sixty-four included five power reactors, six test reactors, the 
nuclear ship Savannah, and fifty-two research reactors and critical facilities. 
Of the latter, forty-two were dismantled and dismantlement is planned for the 
other ten. All were very small plants rated in the tens and hundreds of watts 
(thermal). (Also see Appendix H.) 
The four demonstration nuclear power plants that have been decommissioned 
are Piqua (45.5 MWt), Hallam (256 MWt), Bonus (50 MWt), and Elk River (58.2 
MWt). The first three are entombed, and the Dep'artment of Energy is monitor-
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ing the sites and entombment structures. The entombed reactors contained, 
respectively, 260,000 curies, 300,000 curies, and 50,000 curies of radio-
. . 11 
activity. 
The Elk River reactor is frequently cited in the decommissioning litera-
ture because it is the only commercial power reactor which has been completely 
dismantled. This small 58.2 MWt boiling water reactor, located at Elk River, 
Minnesota, was in commercial operation from 1964 to 1968 as a demonstration 
plant. It was dismantled by the Atomic Energy Commission (forerunner to the 
NRC) over a three year period from 1972 through 1974. A development and test-
ing program was carried out on the cutting processes used on the highly 
radioactive components. Plasma torches operated by remote control were used 
to cut up the reactor vessel, internal piping, and thermal shield. The cut-
ting was done underwater to reduce the radiation exposure for workers in-
volved in the operation. Relatively little decontamination of piping and 
other equipment was necessary because the facility had been shut down four 
years prior to the start of dismantlement. Scrap metal and the contaminated 
and uncontaminated concrete were shipped to waste disposal grounds in Shef-
field, Illinois. The total cost of the dismantlement, including surveillance 
and monitoring, was $6.15 million (in 1974 dollars), compared to $6 million 
for t . 12 cons ruction. 
Experience thus far with reactor decommissioning has provided a basis for 
identifying problems, developing and improving techniques, and preparing 
studies for the decommissioning of large commercial power reactors. In addi-
tion, the experience gained as well as the tools and techniques developed 
during routine operation, inspection, and repair of nuclear facilities will 
be applicable to future decontamination and decommissioning procedures. 
Finally, improved reactor designs can embody measures to aid in the decom-
missioning of future reactors. 13 
Conceptual Studies of Commercial-Size Power Reactors 
Although there have been a number of research and prototype decommission-
ings, no decommissioning of a commercial-size reactor which has operated for 
30 to 40 years has been undertaken in the United States or elsewhere. Detail-
ed conceptual studies of commercial plant decommissionings have been carried 
out, based in part on data from the research and prototype reactor decommis-
sionings. Two major U.S. studies of-this type are briefly described below •. 
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The Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) funded a 1976 study about the decom-
missioning of pressurized and boiling water reactors (1144 megawatts electric 
MWe and 1178 MWe respectively) and high temperature gas reactors. 14 For 
each reactor, five decommissioning alternatives were examined: mothballing; 
entombing; prompt dismantling; and two combination alternatives, mothballing-
delayed dismantling and entombing-delayed dismantling. The study detailed 
procedures and end products, cost estimates, occupational.radiation exposures, 
and pertinent regulations and guidelines. 
The Battelle Memorial Institute's Pacific Northwest Laboratory, under a 
contract with the NRC, investigated a conceptual decommissioning of a 1175 
MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR) power station at the end of its operating 
life. 15 The report, published in June 1978, contains information on the 
technology, safety, and probable costs of immediate dismantlement and deferred 
dismantlement after a period of mothballing. An addendum issued in late 1979 
further explores entombment, radiation hazards, and cost issues. Another 
report examining boiling water reactors (BWR) was issued recently. 
These conceptual studies, although very useful, have several limitations. 
First, each study is general in nature and, consequently, cannot substitute 
for specific analysis of the institutional, economic, and design variables 
associated with individual plants. Further, the generic studies assume that 
a plant has operated routinely, according to all required procedures. In 
actuality, unusual occurrences during the operating life of a reactor may 
create complications for decommissioning. A report by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
points out that: 
The principal decommissioning uncertainties will arise 
from "glossed over" accidental contamination and spills, 
careless operation and poor housekeeping with respect to 
radioactive materials, and lack of up-to-date engineering 
drawings and records of plant modifications. Operators 
of nuclear facilities should therefore bear in mind the 
effect of their actions on decommissioning. 16 
More significant accidents, such as at Three Mile Island, may create major 
decommissioning problems. 
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Second each study asstnnes, for practical purposes, that the current set of 
regulations, as well as technologies, apply to decommissioning. Not only are 
these regulations under review at this time but further changes may occur in 
various related nuclear regulations prior to the time when decommissioning be-
gins on a broad scale. Both studies acknowledge this problem and the fact that 
predicting the impact of regulatory and technical change is, at best, diffi-
cult. 
Third, each study is essentially technical, focusing primarily on methods, 
timing, hazards, and cost estimation. In addition, each discusses the regula-
tory framework as it applies to safeguarding the health and safety of workers 
and the public. Relatively little attention is devoted to the problem of 
financing decommissioning or the various institutional arrangements related to 
that problem. Further, the studies contain no discussion of the implications 
of the timing and development of permanent high level waste storage and ade-
quate low level waste facilities in relation to decommissioning. These mat-
ters must be approached through other studies and analyses. 
Fourth, in the absence of any experience with decommissioning full-sized 
commercial reactors which have operated for 30 years or more, the conceptual 
studies are unavoidably limited to drawing upon theory and upon experience 
from decommissioning small scale reactors. In its review of previous decom-
missioning experience, the Battelle study states: 
A review of the documented cases of decommissioning of 
nuclear facilities shows that, while the facilities decom~ 
missioned were generally small and had operated for rela-
tively short periods of time, the problems encountered 
tended to be common to all decommissioning undertakings. 
The review also shows that a wealth of experience exists 
within the nuclear industry regarding methods and equip-
m~nt for accomplishing decommissioning, and that there 
are no major technical impediments to the successful 
decommissioning of large commercial power reactors.17 
The pressurized water reactor (PWR) used as a reference for the Battelle 
study has vessel walls 2.5 times thicker than Elk River, will have operated 
more than five times longer, and is rated at 3500 MWt rather than 58.2MWt. 
Further, the radiation levels in the Elk River reactor were far below those 
expected in large commercial reactors. 18 Yet, the radiation dose date used 
in the Battelle study was derived from an evaluation of radiation in small 
plants operated for up to six years as well as on theoretical estimates. A 
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comprehensive study of decommissioning by the West German Association of Power 
Stations (VDEW) examined in detail five American nuclear power plant decommis-
sionings, including Elk River. The German study 1 s conclusion: 
emphasized that experience gained from these plants whose 
output individually was l00MWe could only be extrapolated 
to stations with an output of approximately 1300 MWe to a 
very limited extent. 19 
Both AIF and Battelle have identified some of the limits of relying on 
previous experience. The problems associated with the presence of nickel-59 
and niobium-94 in activated reactor metals are a case in point. An AIF repre-
sentative testifying at congressional hearings in 1977 noted that past exper-
ience suggested that cobalt-60 would be the principal radiation problem. But 
reviews of the first draft of the AIF study included some comments about the 
potential problem with nickel-59: 
The immediate reaction of those involved in the study was 
that, you know, that is crazy. But when we looked into 
it and looked into the fact that the plants we are talking 
about decommissioning in the future are facilities that we 
expect to operate for about 40 years ••• , you do generate a 
quantity of this nickel-59 which had not really been Bres-
ent in the prior plants that had been decommissioned.-O 
Current NRC regulations, which include mothballing and entombment as 
acceptable decommissioning alternatives, are based upon experiences where 
nickel-59 never appeared as a problem. AlF concluded that a "possession-only" 
license for a decommissioned and mothballed 1-'vlR could not be terminated for 
21 505,000 years to allow time for radiation to decay to release levels. 
Battelle, focusing on both nickel and niobium, rejected entombment (at least 
with reactor internals) as a permanent option because no fabricated structure 
could be expected to outlast and successfully contain the sources of radio-
. . b d . h. . 22 activity entom e wit in it. 
As a result of the AIF and Battelle studies, both mothballing and entomb-
ment appear to be unacceptable for permanent decommissioning. Care should be 
taken in referring to a mothballed or entombed reactor as having been "decom-
missioned." It would be more accurate to characterize the reactor as partial-
ly decommissioned, pending final removal or decay of the radiation and termin-
ation of the owner's license and obligations. 23 
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The fact that there is no actual experience with decommissioning large 
plants which have operated for 30 to 40 years gives rise to some of the uncer-
tainty and controversy about.decommissioning alternatives. This is evident in 
the following comparison of mothballing, entombment and dismantlement in terms 
of costs, occupational and public hazards from radioactivity, and land use. 
COSTS OF DECOMMISSIONING 
In the absence of actual experience and cost data on decommissioning a 
commercial sized nuclear plant, it is not surprising that estimates of costs 
for decommissioning alternatives vary widely in the nuclear literature. 
Assumptions and methodologies differ between studies, and each study defines, 
to some extent, its own decommissioning alternatives. Thus, the decommission-
ing approach, what it covers, the timing of various phases of decommissioning, 
and the type and size of the reactor may vary from study to study, making 
comparisons somewhat difficult. In addition, current regulations are applied 
although they contain few detailed standards or procedures for decommissioning. 
This body of regulations is currently under review, and changes in the immed-
iate future as well as in the years prior to the start of decommissioning on 
a broad scale complicate the problem of estimating costs. Finally, the time 
between the initial operation of a reactor and its ultimate decommissioning 
is at least 30 to 40 years. Estimates of future costs and revenue require-
ments necessary to carry out decommissioning must weigh the impact of inflation 
on general price levels, and within the nuclear industry must account for 
changing technology as it.relates to decommissioning, and must anticipate 
likely changes in regulations and waste disposal. 
It is_ beyond the scope of this paper to critically examine and compare 
cost estimates. Instead, estimates from the AIF and Battelle studies are out-
lined briefly here. A number of ad~itional estimates are presented in Appen-
dix H. Cost estimates range from about $3 million for initial mothballing 
expenditures to well over $100 million for dismantlement. Utility estimates 
have tended to be much higher than those made by federal authorities or con-
tractors, and some are three times higher than AIF's estimates for dismantle-
ment. 24 
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Mothballing has been predicted to have the lowest initial cost because it 
entails the least amount of dismantlement and only minor construction of addi-
tional physical access barriers. However, its long-term costs are the highest 
because of the degree of surveillance required and the indefinite time period 
involved. Estimates of initial costs for mothballing are approximately $3.4 
million (AIF) and $9.5 million (Battelle) at 1978 price lev~ls plus subsequent 
annual costs ranging from $80,000 to over $200,000, depending on the degree of 
security required. 
Prompt dismantlement has the highest initial costs but requires no con-
tinuing expenditures by the plant owner provided the radioactive components 
are completely removed. Dismantlement of only the nuclear portions of the 
plant has been estimated at $30.3 million (AIF) and $31.0 million (Battelle) 
in 1978 prices. Demolition of the non-radioactive portions of a plant would 
add 25-33 percent to these estimates. It" is common to see the Battelle esti-
mate quoted as $42.1 million which includes dismantlement of all facilities 
plus the cost of shipping the spent fuel away from the site. However, non-
nuclear demolition and shipment of spent fuel may not be decommissioning ex-
penses in the view of some utilities and public service commissions. Spent 
fuel shipment is an operational expense, and it is difficult to distinguish 
non-nuclear demolition from measures taken in closing other types of power 
plants or industrial facilities in the absence of the public safety question 
posed by the radiation in parts of a nuclear plant. 
Cost estimates for entombment fall between the estimates for dismantle-
ment and mothballing but vary substantially. AIF estimated entombment at 
$11.1 million and annual costs up to $90,000 in 1978 prices. Battelle's esti-
mates were $21 million and $40,000 annually. Entombment requires greater 
initial expenditures than mothballing because of the construction of more ex-
tensive physical barriers, but its annual surveillance costs tend to be lower. 
It should be noted that cost estimates for mothballing and entombment carry 
an additional element of uncertainty because of the probability that future 
measures in the form of maintenance or dismantlement will be necessary. 
In addition to the reasons stated earlier, several other factors may 
ff h f . 25 D 1 . 1 f a ect t e accuracy o cost estimates. eep geo ogica storage o some 
highly activated, long-lived decommissioning wastes (approximately 88 cubic 
meters) could increase costs by $1.8 million. Radiation levels higher than 
those anticipated, would raise decommissioning costs slightly. Contracting 
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out the decommissioning job rather than using utility staff might raise dis-
mantlement costs by 26 percent. Regional variations in labor prices could in-
crease costs, and doubling burial charges for low level storage could add 9 
percent to the cost of dismantlement. 
Other factors may decrease decommissioning costs in the future. These 
include new reactor designs, the use of improved technology at a net cost 
saving, economies of scale associated with decommissioning larger plants, in-
creased experience and efficiency, and increases in the value of scrap mater-
ials salvaged from decommissioned plants. 
Still another cause for variation among cost escimates, though not appli-
cable to the two major studies, is the size of the plant. AIF estimated 
roughly an 18 percent savings on dismantling a 550 MWe plant rather than the 
1144 MWe plant used in the study. The cost reductions estimated by Battelle 
26 were 48 percent £or a 440 MWe plant and 21 percent for a 850 MWe plant. 
Figures are for PWR plants, but estimates for BWRs are expected to be similar. 
It is nonetheless difficult to apply these factors in any shorthand fashion. 
The Battelle study reviewed seven other European and American generic and 
· 27 site specific decommissioning analyses. Variations among assumptions and 
methodologies were evident and in some cases substantial. Additionally, com-
parison was encumbered by differences in the amount of detail reported by each 
study. Several conclusions were drawn. First, "it is virtually impossible 
to make any detailed comparison among the various studies." Second, although 
dismantlement costs compared on a 1978 basis ranged from $43 million for the 
Battelle and AIF studies to $88 million, the higher cost estimates reflected 
decommis · • . . . . 28 sioning measures that may be excessively conservative or restrictive. 
Complete removal of all structural foundations and cutting radioactive equip-
ment to fit .in relatively small containers for waste disposal are examples. 
Third , none of the studies identified any technical or safety impediments to 
decommissioning large PWRs, although ~eactor design changes, technical devel-
. opments in decontamination, and alternative decommissioning approaches could 
reduce costs and radiation exposures. And finally, Battelle observed that 
realist ic cost estimates can be derived only from detailed site specific 
analyses. 
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OCCUPATIONAL AND PUBLIC HAZARDS FROM RADIATION 
As noted in Part I, the radionuclides of most concern in decommissioning 
are: iron-55, cobalt-60, nickel-59, nickel-63, carbon-14, and niobium-94. 
(See Appendix I). Of these, cobalt-60 presents the greatest hazard immediate-
ly after shutdown of the reactor and over the next 80 to lQO years during 
which time the rate of decay of the cobalt-60 controls reductions in the rad-
29 iation dose rate. Its intensity, at any given time, determines whether 
remote or manual operations should be used and the degree of personnel shield-
ing necessary. However, after the first century, it is the nickel-59 and 
niobium-94 that predominate in determining the rate of reduction in the radia-
tion dose rate from activated materials. Because of their long half-lives, 
80,000 and 20,000 years respectively, these radionuclides continue to emit 
radiation substantially above safe release levels for extremely long periods 
f . 30 o time. 
Of the three primary decommissioning alternatives, prompt dismantlement 
presents the greatest occupational radiation hazard. The Battelle study's 
estimate of the occupational radiation dose from dismantlement is 1404 man-
rems plus another 103 man-rems from the transportation of waste materials. 31 
Mothballing is estimated to entail doses of 426 man-rems during initial stages 
plus 14 from transportation of decontamination wastes and an additional 14 for 
up to 100 years of safe storage. Entombment is estimated to entail doses of 
900 man-rems plus 16 during transportation of wastes. The AIF study estimates 
are lower: approximately 150 man-rems for mothballing, 130 for entombment, and 
630 for dismantlement. 32 Differences between studies are attributable to 
varying assumptions about radiation present, decontamination procedures, and 
personnel shielding. 
The principal impact of radiation on the public is expected to occur dur-
ing transportation of waste materials to a disposal site. Because prompt 
dismantlement results in the largest volume of radioactive wastes and entails 
moving them at a time when they are most radioactive, it presents the great-
est short term hazard to the public. Battelle estimated the volume of PWR 
dismantlement wastes at approximately 18,000 cubic meters. 33 AIF estimated 
such wastes at 13,000 cubic yards. The cancelled Tyrone nuclear power plant 
in Wisconsin would have required about 2,600 shipments of radioactive wastes 
after dismantlement, 875 for entombment, and 225 for mothballing. 34 
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Although prompt dismantlement results in the greatest occupational and 
short-term hazards, it does not present long-term risks to the public at or 
around the plant site. Permanent mothballing and entombment, on the other 
hand, may require maintenance and surveillance for extremely long periods, 
well beyond 100,000 years. There appear to be no cost-benefit analyses on the 
public health danger posed by maintaining radioactively contaminated buildings, 
Waste tanks, equipment, and grounds encased in concrete. 35 Their permeability 
and resistance to weather is unknown or unspecified. The Battelle study notes 
that a 100,000 year time span vastly exceeds the known lifetime of any fabri-
cated structures. 
LAND USE 
Complete dismantlement clears the plant site and, provided that sources of 
radi· at. ff · 1 d . · d f h · 36 ion are e ective y remove, permits unrestricte use o tat site. 
However, dismantlement requires land for the disposal of the radioactive mater-
ials--2.s acres in the case of a large plant such as the proposed but canceled 
Tyrone plant. Mothballing and entombment leave radioactive materials on the 
site requiring maintenance and surveillance. The land commitment estimated for 
Tyrone was 12 acres. Burial of materials that would have been removed from the 
Tyrone plant during mothballing or entombment was estimated to require 0.05 
acres and O. 05 to o". l acres respectively. 37 
"The proliferation of sites permanently committed to the containment of 
radioactive materials" is presented as one reason why permanent entombment 
was found unsatisfactory by the Battelle study. 38 Another problem raised by 
entombed or mothballed plants is how the use of adjacent land can and should 
be restricted. Such activities as mining obviously would jeopardize the 
security of the radioactive material. 
OTHER DECOMMISSIONING ALTERNATIVES 
Problems related to costs, radiation doses, and the adequacy of physical 
and institutional arrangements of the primary decommissioning options led to 
consideration of several variations. These are recommissioning, entombment 
~ the highly activated reactor internals, mothballing followed by de-
layed dismantlement, and entombment followed by delayed dismantlement. The 
35 
periods of delay associated with the latter two alternatives vary but are 
typically 30, 50, or 100 years. 
Recommissioning 
Recommissioning has been characterized as a measure to be taken in lieu 
of decommissioning~ 39 It is not mentioned in NRC regulations, guides, or 
studies. Recommissioning involves refurbishing a nuclear plant and continuing 
power generation beyond the period of the intial operating license. It is 
unlike conversion described earlier, in which a new nuclear system is in-
stalled in conjunction with existing turbines. Recommissioning entails only 
selective repair and equipment replacement to satisfy NRC design and safety 
criteria ann to enable re-licensing of the plant. Essentially, extending a 
nuclear plant's operating life through recommissioning is proposed as an eco-
nomically attractive alternative to decommissioning the plant after its initial 
operating license expires. Whether the economics justify the option is un-
known. Moreover, re-licensing has never occurred, and it is expected that 
changes in NRC regulations would be required. Even if a plant were recommis-
sioned, ultimately decommissioning still would be necessary. 
Entombment Without Reactor 
Entombment without reactor internals involves dismantling and removing 
those activated metal reactor components that contain long-lived radionuclides 
prior to entombing the remaining contaminated equipment and materials. 40 
Radiation left in the entombed plant would be expected to decay in about 100 
years, permitting termination of the possession-only license at that time. 
However, according to Battelle estimates, the procedure incurs higher radia-
. tion exposures for workers than simple entombment because of removing and 
transporting the reactor. Occupational radiation doses from this entombment/ 
removal and transportation process would be approximately 1,000 man-rems and 
21 man-rems respectively or two-thirds the level associated with prompt dis-
mantlement. Procedures for demonstrating that the entombed radiation has in 
fact decayed to unrestricted levels so that license termination can be per-
mitted are unclear. Interestingly, removing the reactor also removes the 
primary rationale for using the more secure physical access and containment 
barriers normally associated with entombment. Battelle estimated the cost 
of entombment/reactor removal at nearly $25 million (1978) or $29 million 
including 100 years of monitoring and surveillance. Batelle did not include 
costs for final disposition of the structure. 
36 
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Delayed Dismantlement 
The rationale for delaying dismantlement is twofold. First, permitting 
radiation to decay reduces occupational exposures associated with removal and 
transportation of the reactor internals and other radioactive wastes and re-
duces the overall volume of such wastes. Consequently, the complexity and 
cost of the dismantlement process are reduced. Battelle estimated that delay-
ing dismantlement 30 years would reduce occupational radiation exposures to 
less than 2 percent of the level associated with prompt dismantlement. 41 After 
50 years, exposures would be down to 0.16 percent, and after 100 years, the 
level would be 0.08 percent. These reductions are attributable primarily to 
the decay of cobalt-60. Reductions in the volume of contaminated wastes for 
disposal also contribute to co~t reductions. Battelle estimated radioactive 
~aste volumes in cubic meters for different periods of delay prior to dis-
mantlement: for either prompt dismantlement or after 30 years delay--17,900; 
· 42 
after 50 years--1,830; and after 100.years--1,780. 
The second advantage of delay is that combining a period of "protective 
Storage" with provisions for ultimate dismantlement avoids the disadvantages 
of permanent mothballing or entombment. Dismantlement, even though delayed, 
removes the uncertainty that deterioration of physical containment structures 
or lapses in institutional arrangements will permit radiation to escape and 
endanger the public at some future time. However, although the long term con-
1 
cerns will be eliminated, some argue that even delays of a few decades are 
cause for concern with respect to the adequacy and assurance of institutional 
and financial arrangements. 
The distinction between entombment/delayed dismantlement and mothballing/ 
delayed dismantlement relates to the extent of physical access and containment 
barriers constructed and the degree of surveillance required during the stor-
age period. With the entombment/dismantlement approach, the entombment used 
~
0 uld be a more easily demolished structure than that used in permanent en-
tombment. Openings would be sealed but voids within the plant would not be 
filled with concrete. The choice between using entombment or mothballing 
~
0 uld depend on cost and site specific considerations. Mothballing might be 
used when the site already is under surveillance because of other facilities 
located there. Entombment might be used at a remote site. 
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Comparison of cost estimates in studies or deferred dismantlement are 
somewhat difficult because of differences in assumptions. 43 Examples of dif-
ferences are the content and ·cost of preparatory measures and the extent of 
surveillance employed. These differences can determine whether the delayed 
approach appears more or less costly than prompt dismantlement of the plant. 
AIF, with reference to a PWR and a 108 year delay, estimated the cost of 
entombment/delayed dismantlement to be $23 million (1978). Mothballing/delayed 
dismantlement could cost between $20 and $33 million (1978), depending on the 
extent of security involved. Battelle estimated the costs of safe storage/ 
delayed dismantlement of a PWR for three different periods: 30 years, $40.8 
million; 50 years, $35.8million; and 100 years, $39.8 million (1978). Cost 
reductions from further reduction in the volume of wastes beyond fifty years 
would be negligible and offset by the cost of continuing surveillance, 
Occupational radiation doses resulting from the two delayed dismantlement 
alternatives depend on the nature of measures taken prior to the period of de-
lay. These measures include the extent of decontamination and the duration of 
the delay between initial preparations and final dismantlement. The AIF study 
states that the primary radioactivity in a PWR will have decayed to safe 
levels 104 years after plant shutdown. The total decommissioning radiation 
dosage from the two delay alternatives is estimated to range from 440 to 460 
44 
man-rems. The Battelle study, however, notes that: 
Relatively little reduction in accumulated occupational 
radiation dose is estimated to result from deferment of 
the decommissioning sequence beyond 30 years, and vir-
tually no reduction results from deferment beyond 50 
years.4 5 
The Battelle study estimated the total radiation exposure would be approxi-
mately 1,529 man-rems if a plant were promptly dismantled. Total decommission-
ing radiation doses associated with delayed dismantlement and different periods 
of safe storage were: 30 years, 487 man~rems (mostly due to preparations for 
safe storage); 50 years, 459 man-rems; and 100 years, 458 man-rems. (Appendix 
H provides a more complete breakdown of Battelle's estimates.) 
Battelle and AIF differ on what period of delay provides substantial re-
duction in costs. AIF tends to focus on the 100 year period, and Battelle's 
analysis seems to imply a 50 year period. The report by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, states that: 
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The optimum delay period will have to be determined for 
each decommissioning case as it is a function of the iso-
topes involved, their concentration and distribution, the 
benefits to the decommissioning operations resulting from 
the delay, and the surveillance costs during the delay 
period. 46 
Battelle also notes that: 
In practice, the choice [of dismantlement] will probably 
be made based on a detailed analysis of which approach is 
most financially advantageous to the station owner. 47 
Exactly what criteria will ultimately be applied to decisions about decommis-
sioning alternatives is an evolving issue. Conclusions depend not only on 
Which are selected but upon the emphasis accorded to different criteria. A 
further discussion of potential regulatory changes is found in Part III of this 
report. 
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One of the many questions raised by the Three Mile Island Plant accident 
in 1979 is how to decommission a plant after a severe accident. An accident 
Which necessitates decommissioning (e.g. loss of coolant with all fuel cladding 
bursting) conceivably could occur at any time during the lifetime of a plant. 
Yet most studies of 1nuclear power plant decommissionings implicitly assume that 
a Plant's final shut-down occurs after 30 to 40 years of normal operation. 
Those studies which do examine the effects of an accident usually focus on 
individual components within a plant. Few studies investigate the total state 
of a plant after a severe accident. One such study--"Analysis of the Effects 
of Severe Accidents on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants"--was under-
taken by the German government and completed in 1976. 48 The following is a 
brief review of some of the decommissioning problems identified by this study. 
A principal difficulty with both conceptual studies of several accidents 
and emergency standby decommissioning plans is the large number of possible 
accidents and the complexity of processes which may occur during an accident. 
The decommissioning of a normal plant may be based in part on known character-
istics of the plant and its radioactivity. Experimental decommissionings have 
led to the development of standardized procedures, techniques, and equipment. 
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But for a decommissioning necessitated by an accident, advance planning and de-
velopment may be impossible: 
Preliminary extensive detailed planning is not sensible 
and is basically impossible since the problems which occur 
are to a certain extent specific to the facility and the 
accident in question and the range of variation is very 
wide ••• Because of the large number of possible accidents 
and because of the complexity of the damaging effects and 
the resulting demands, universal equipment (for different 
plants, accidents4 missions) are only advisable to a very 
limited extent ••• 9 
The lack of advanced planning for an accident-related decommissioning 
necessitates many ad hoc decisions and improvisations after such an accident 
occurs. A major challenge is determining the post accident condition of the 
plant, including its core or fuel elements. Remotely controlled special equip-
ment must be used to record conditions since the vast quantities of radiation 
released in the plant prohibit entry. Even if special equipment is available, 
many uncertainties remain, which further complicate decommissioning planning: 
The use of such equipment is made difficult by the local 
conditions in the plant, by the damage and by the debris 
lying in the area. Thus in some portions of the safety 
vessel, the current condition can only be recorded to a 
limited extent or cannot be recorded at all.SO 
Data collected on the condition of the plant provides the basis for decom-
missioning requirements and procedures. The feasibility of decommissioning 
1. 
2. 
3, 
4. 
5, 
6, 
within a few years of an accident depends "mainly on the efficiency of a remote 7, 
pre-decontamination and on the availability of remotely controlled special equip~ 8. 
ment. 1151 
A detailed examination of a hypothetical accident-related decommissioning 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, from the brief comments above, it 
should be evident that the personnel, time, money, and risk involved in a de-
commissioning after a severe accident are far greater than for a decommissioning 
at the end of a plant's life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PART III 
REGULATIONS AND FINANCING 
This part is presented in two sections. The first outlines the major 
characteristics of the regulatory framework within which decommissioning must 
he considered. Primarily it focuses on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
The second section discusses the problem of financing the cost of decommission-
ing. Although the NRC plays a role in the financing problem, it is clear that 
the major actors are the utilities and the public service commissions in each 
state. 
REGULATIONS ON DECOMMISSIONING 
~ck ground 
Since 1974 when the Energy Reorganization Ac.:t split up the Atomic Energy 
Conunission, the NRC--the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--has been the agency 
responsible for regulating the private uses of nuclear materials. 1 The major 
divisions of the NRC include the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and the Office of Nuclear 
I 
Regulatory Research. The first two regulate, respectively, nuclear reactors 
and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The latter is a support office providing 
the agency with its own research capability. 
The NRC's authority, derived from statute and detailed in a body of regu-
lations, entails overseeing nuclear power plants, uranium mills, facilities 
making or processing nuclear fuel, and users of source, by-product, and special 
nuclear material. 2 
It is the purpose of this review to determine the extent to which NRC reg-
ulations cover the activity of decommissioning a nuclear power plant. While 
th· 1.s paper focuses primarily on the decommissioning of nuclear power plant 
reactors, other regulations in existence apply to decommissioning uranium mills, 
reprocessing plants, and other nuclear facilities. 
The NRC itself began an evaluation of its regulatory framework for decom-
missioning in 1975. 3 The regulations coming under review appear in 10 CFR 
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Parts 30, 40, 50, and 70 which include licensing for production and utilization 
facilities and licensing for by-product, source, and special nuclear materials. 
Concurrently, in mid-1977, the NRC was petitioned by the Public Interest Re-
search Group (PIRG) and others requesting a rulemaking covering specific finan-
· 1 d d f d · · · 4 cia arrangements an proce ures or ecommissioning. 
In March 1978, the NRC issued a "Plan for Reevaluation of NRC Policy on 
Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities" later revised in December 1978. Also in 
March 1978, the NRC published its "Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making on 
Decommissioning Criteria for Nuclear Facilities. 115 As expressed in the Federal 
Register, the NRC's objective is consideration of regulatory amendments for 
more specific guidance on decommissioning criteria. The review builds on pyi-
mary technical studies contracted in 1975 and submitted between 1977 and 1980. 6 
The Commission, using these studies as well as its own "Plan," conducted a pub-
lic hearing and three state workshops on the subject in mid-1978. Additional 
reports and revisions were completed in 1979, and a second round of state work-
shops took place in September 1979. 7 
Pertinent Regulations 
Numbered items below briefly summarize NRC regulations that are pertinent 
to decommissioning and are currently in effect. The paragraphs following each 
summary elaborate and comment on the foregoing regulation. It is this set of 
regulations and the potential need for others that is being reviewed by the 
Commission. 8 Bowever, the studies of technology, safety and costs of decom-
missioning commissioned by the NRC, and mentioned earlier, assume that future 
decommissioning would be carried out under the existing regulatory framework. 
1. Regulations in 10 CFR 50, Section 50.33(f) require the NRC 
to obtain, prior to issuing a license, sufficient informa-
tion to demonstrate the applicant's financial qualifications 
for (a) operating a nuclear facility, and (b) shutting it 
down and maintaining it in a safe condition. 
The regulation applies to production and utilization facility licenses not 
to facilities operated under material licenses. It is noteworthy that it re-
fers to maintaining a facility rather than final disposal of a facility or its 
wastes. The requisite financial evaluation is a general one and occurs far in 
advance of the decommissioning activity. The evaluation does not include de-
tailed plans or cost estimates for decommissioning. 
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Other regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.71, "Maintenance of Records, 
Making Reports," require licensees to provide updates on their financial status 
to the NRC. 
The NRC has "no requirement that licensees make specific financial pro-
visions to cover the cost of future decommissioning" except in the case of 
uranium mills. 9 
2. Regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.82(a) cover term-
ination of production and utilization licenses. Licensees 
applying to terminate a license may be required by the NRC 
to provide information on proposed site decontamination, 
disposal of radioactive wastes, and dismantling and dispo-
sal of the facility. Section 50.82(b) provides that the 
NRC may, upon receiving satisfactory information, author-
ize dismantling, disposal, and the terraination of the 
license in accordance with any conditions specified in the 
order of authorization. 
The phrasing of the regulation emphasizes the deferment of any detailed 
consideration of decommissioning until the end of the facility's useful life 
and particularly whenever application is made to terminate the license. Al-
though the regulation mentions dismantling, it does not require it. 10 
However, the regulation does require that dismantling of the facility and 
disposal of components be performed in accordance with regulations and "not be 
inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the 
Public. 1111 
The regulation underscores the NRC's authority to set explicit condi-
tions for appropriate dismantling and disposal. 
3. Guidelines acceptable to the NRC for "Termination of Oper-
ating Licenses for Nuclear Reactors" are stated in NRC 
Regulatory Guide 1.86 issued in current form in June 1974. 
The guide defines four acceptable methods of decommission-
ing: mothballing, in-place entombment, removal and dis-
mantling, and conversion to a new nuclear or fossil fuel 
system. Additionally, it prescribes, in the NRC's view, 
acceptable procedures and stanrlRrds for surveillance, 
security, and decontamination.1 2 
Compliance with regulatory guides is not required. They do not carry the 
Weight or authority of regulations. However, the guides embody the NRC 1 s con-
ception of acceptable methods of implementation and compliance with regulations. 
On this point, an NRC review has concluded that Regulatory Guide 1.86 is "flaw-
13 
ed as a regulatory document." The review identified numerous definitional 
Problems and open issues that will be addressed in the NRC's review of decom-· 
missioning. 
47 
Regulatory Guide 1.86 does not impose a specific mode of decommissioning. 
It neither lays out a definite timetable nor suggests an NRC preference in de-
commissioning. The guide outlines steps for the licensee to follow in changing 
from an operating to a possession-only license, a status which entails reduced 
surveillance requirements. 
The guide concludes with a chart showing "Acceptable Surface Contamination 
Levels. 1114 Licensees must decontaminate the site to levels consistent with 
those in the guide before the NRC will authorize termination of the license and 
its attendant responsibilities. However, these limits relate to contamination 
and do not discuss hazards related to induced radiation in activated metals and 
concrete. 
As a variation from Regulatory Guide 1.86, the Battelle Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory study of reactor decommissioning notes that the NRC may issue a mod-
ified-operating license rather than a possession-only license in the early 
h f d · · · 15 Th . h 1 . f pases o ecomm1ss1on1ng. e reason is tat many pant operations a ter 
shut-down of the reactor will remain much the same and require the care and 
procedures called for in the full operating license. The study notes that 
"(A)ctive operations will be conducted in the plant involving radioactive ma-
terial and utilization of existing systems and components that will result in 
release of effluents to the environment. Additionally, unplanned releases of 
radioactive material are possible from accidents during decommissioning •. 1116 
In summary, the NRC's license status decision is important in assuring adequate 
safeguards. 
4. 10 CFR Part 51 covers "Licensing and Regulatory Policy and 
Procedures for Environmental Protection." Under these reg-
ulations, specifically Section 51.5.6(7), amendments to 
licenses and authorizations for decommissioning of a reac-
tor may or may not require an environmental impact statement 
of proposed actions. 
A review of four past nuclear reactor power plant environmental impact 
statements (EIS) as well as those covering Northern States Power's (NSP) Minne-
17 
sota plants revealed that decommissioning was given only perfunctory treatment. 
Each refers to the task as one arising near the end of the plant's useful life, 
and each briefly outlines four "alternative levels of restoration at the plant 
site." While none patently states that economics alone would determine the 
appropriate level of restoration, each emphasizes that at current land values 
complete restoration would probably not be justified by an economic analysis. 
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Without complete removal of all radioactive equipment and materials, the land 
occupied by the facility would be lost to productive uses. 
Amendments to NRC regulations will "constitute a major Federal action sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment and as such will re-
quire the preparation of an environmental impact statement pursuant to Section 
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1118 The NRC is pre-
paring a generic environmental impact statement covering the general problem of 
d 19 ecommissioning and providing a basis for NRC regulatory changes. Thus, the 
NEPA/EIS process is being brought to bear more forcefully on the problems of 
decommissioning than in the past. 
Whether individual plants will need an EIS when application for license 
amendment is made to begin decommissioning is unclear. The existence of the 
generic EIS and the results of site specific environmental appraisals could 
justify, in the NRC's view, a determination not to proceed with a full Eis. 20 
This would require a formal "negative declaration" by the NRC stating the ab-
sence of need for an EIS based on the appraisal. 
Q_ther Regulatory Factors 
Various regulations cover functions similar to those for decommissioning. 
Materials handling, security, transportation, worker safety, and disposal are 
now monitored by the NRC and other federal and state agencies. However, where 
decommissioning dep~rts from current activities pertinent regulations and pro-
cedures may require modification. 
Transportation of radioactive materials and wastes is regulated by the NRC 
and the Department of Transportation, often in cooperation with states which 
have adopted DOT standards. 21 Occupational radiation exposure in nuclear plants 
is regulated by the NRC, and it is expected that strict oversite and regulation 
Would continue during decommissioning due to the highly contaminated working 
areas and the dismantlement processes involved. Environmental radiation emis-
sions come under both NRC and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules. 
Under the President's Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1970, the 1977 Clean Air 
Act amendments, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA assumed a predominate 
role in identifying and regulating environmental radiation impacts beyond the 
b . 
oundaries of a nuclear plant. Thus, the NRC no longer has exclusive control 
of radioactive emissions into the air or water. The EPA has not set specific 
decommissioning regulations, but it is developing con·tamination limits for re-
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1 . ·1 t . d · 1 d · · · 22 easing soi s o Jnrestricte use, one step in p ant ecommissioning. Regu-
lations covering radiation limits for induced activity in equipment and con-
crete prior to unrestricted release have not been developed. Finally, in the 
case of air emissions of radioactive pollutants, state regulatory authority 
under the Clean Air Act is incr.eased as states are not pre-empted from setting 
standards more stringent than EPA standards. 23 
Generally, NRC authority pre-empts state regulation over nuclear power 
plants under Section 274 of the 1959 Atomic Energy Act. For limited purposes 
however, a state may take over the NRC's regulatory role by becoming an "Agree-
ment State." The regulatory programs of Agreement States must conform to NRC 
regulations and standards. 24 As of early 1980, there are 26 Agreement States. 
Minnesota is a Non-Agreement State. The NRC could permit Agreement States to 
oversee decommissioning, but it is doubtful that states, either agreement or 
non-agreement, could impose more rigorous decommissioning regulations than the 
NRC due to federal pre-emption of the regulatory function. 25 
In addition to agreement state powers, states exercise authority in sev-
eral areas: permits and monitoring of transportation; land use and facility 
siting; environmental impact assessments; setting standards and monitoring air 
emissions; monitoring health risks for workers and citizens; evaluating methods 
of generation, pricing, and transmission of electricity; and evaluating the 
rate implications of design and safety factors. 26 Decommissioning raises ques-
tions in each of these areas. 
Policy Questions 
Clearly, the NRC as the prime regulator of commercial nuclear power is the 
.lead agency in expediting policy changes; Extensive reviews are currently un-
derway, and draft regulations are expected in late 1981. The NRC has identi-
fied five principal areas of concern: mode, timing, 'planning, financia~ assur- ] 
ance, and residual radiation. Although no decisions have been made, an NRC 
discus~don paper provides preliminary indications of possible regu.latory 
27 
changes. The primary objective would he dismantlement of nuclear facilities, 
removal of radiation, and release of sites for unrestricted use at the earliest 
. 1 d f f ·1· . · 28 D · · · 1 practica ate a ter aci ities cease operations. ecommissioning pans, 
for all kinds of nuclear facilities including reactors, would be required. Res-
idual radiation limits, based on the ALARA concept (as low as reasonably 
achievable, from 10 CFR 50 Appendix I), are under discussion within the NRC and 
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between the NRC and EPA. State workshops in 1978 included references to maxi-
mum exposure limits of 1 mrem per year. Currently, a limit of 5 mrem per year 
to the maximum exposed individual is being examined as a standard for release 
of a site for unrestricted use. The standard would be for exposure in addition 
to normal background radiation and involves questions of what is technically 
measurable and the pathways through which analysis of exposure should be mod-
eled.29 
The mode and timing of decommissioning, as present in the discussion paper, 
would depend on the half-life of the most critical and/or abundant radionuclide 
Present in the facility at shut-down. 30 Three categories would be involved: 
half-life about 5 years; half-life about 30 years, and half-life greater than 
30 years. Alternative acceptable modes and timing for decommissioning would be 
established for each category. Under this system, reactors would be either dis-
mantled immediately or held in safe storage for thirty years and then dismantled. 
Entombment would be unacceptable. 
Thus far, the NRC's failure to adopt more definitive regulations on de-
commissioning and waste disposal has impaired the ability of states and plant 
air 0 Wners to adequately plan for decommissioning. Partially for this reason, the 
hods 
ues-
the 
role of states in decommissioning remains an open and serious question. Adopt-
ing a wait-and-see approach, states will forego opportunities to influence 
final NRC regulations. Alternatively, effective participation in the process 
requires a thorough1 review of decommissioning to identify principal state con-
cerns and objectives. Moreover, participating in policy review and implementa-
tion necessitates adequate budgets and staffing. 
un- FINANCING DECOMMISSIONING 
:i-
;ur-
:ies, 
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The financial treatment of decommissioning is a major policy problem. 
tlealth and safety, as well as economic considerations, warrant thorough evalua-
tion of alternative approaches to adequate financing. Because the radiological 
hazards created during the nuclear generation of electricity persist for ex-
tremely long periods of time, the O;)ligation to protect the public is likewise 
Persist~nt and serious. Decornrnissioning is a necessary step in meeting that 
obligation, and its cost is an inescapable one associated with the investment in 
nuclear power and requires adequate financial planning and funding. 31 
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The choice of nuclear power as a source of electricity rests partially on 
a comparison of its economic costs with those of available alternatives. To be 
properly evaluated, the price of nuclear power must include the costs of de-
commissioning. Failure to account for those costs biases the choice in favor 
of the nuclear option. Building future costs into current analysis and pric-
ing is one function of mechanisms for financing decommissioning. 
As noted earlier, current NRC regulations require only a general assess-
ment of financial capacity to shut-down and safely maintain a facility. That 
determination occurs prior to licensing. Furthermore, the NRC admits a ten-
dency to rely on the relatively protected position of publicly regulated 
utilities as a sufficient guarantee of their financial capacity to decommission 
32 power reactors. 
A Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) petition challenged the adequacy 
of the NRC's approach to ~he financing question. 33 The petition called upon 
the NRC to implement rules requiring licensees to post bonds to be hel~ in 
escrow, create funded escrow accounts, or utilize sinking funds linked to a 
surety arrangement in order to ensure the future availability and adequacy of 
decommissioning funds. The NRG denied that part of the petition calling for E 
specific funding requirements. 34 As justification, the NRC cited the adequacy t 
of current financial evaluations, questions about its own authority to require a 
specific arrangements and guarantees, and the unavailability in the market of a 
large, long term bonds as well as the fact that such bonds would not necessar- c 
ily accomplish the goals contained in the PIRG petition. The extent of NRC 
authority in this area has been questioned on several occasions, but the NRC 
is continuing to review the financing problem as principal regulatory con-
. cern. 35 In fact, the NRC's own discussion paper on the issue indicates that 
"the goals in the area of financing the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
should be to provide a very high degree of assurance that the licensee-will pay 
the costs and to allow a wide latitude of approaches to implement that &ssur-
ance.1136 
Generally, specific arrangements for financing decommissioning result from 
the interaction of state public service regulators and the affected utilities 
as well as public and private intervenors in the rate setting processes of the 
different states. Additionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) which regulates interstate sales of electricity plays a role in setting 
interstate standards. Of 32 utilities responding to a 1977 General Account-
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ing Office (GAO) survey, 15 had established no special provisions for funding 
decormnissioning. 37 The rationale in those instar1ces appears to have been the 
expectation that the cost of ·decommissioning would be repaid from revenues 
generated after the work occurs. Examples of other arrangements implemented 
or considered by several states are described in Appendix J. 
Several characteristics of the decommissioning problem highlight the sig-
nificance of choosing a financing mechanism, and illustrate the complexity of 
th . 38 
e issue. They include: (1) the substantial costs of decommissioning, 
(2 ) the future nature of decommissioning, (3) the uncertain solvency of facil-
ity owners at the time of decommissioning, and (4) the possibility of premature 
sion shut-do~n of a nuclear power plant. 
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(1) Substantial Costs 
Accomplishing decommissioning will require a substantial expenditure by 
Plant owners. 39 Different methods have different costs, and although those 
costs are not great in relation .to the-original capital cost of a plant, none 
are trivial. Moreover, unlike the cost of construction or the cost of re-
fueling a nuclear plant, the cost of decommissioning is an expense which gen-
erates no new revenues, a fact which led one analyst to note that utilities 
have "no d. . . . d . . ,,40 C . d irect economic incentive ••• to ecommission. ost estimates, ma e 
at differeut times, for complete dismantlement range up to $100 million or more, 
at a time when the capital cost of a plant is approximately $1 billion. In per-
centage terms, this ranges up to about 10 percent of capital cost, but a figure 
as high as 24 percent of capital investment has also been suggested. However, 
When expressed in terms of revenue requirements to fund decommissioning in re-
lati 
on to total revenue requirements, which includes amortization for capital 
autl fuel as well as operational expenses,· the percentages are smaller. Chapman, 
in an analysis for the California Energy Commission estimated decommissioning 
revenues to range from 3 to 8 percent of total revenues. 41 Nonetheless, the 
COS t is not negligible, and if not paid-by the facility owners and power users, 
it is a substantial cost that will have to be paid by the public. 
(2) Future Nature of Decommissioning 
Under normal circumstances, decommissioning will occur at least thirty to 
forty Years after a reactor commences operation, and if prompt dismantlement is 
the option selected, six to eight years will elapse while decommissioning is in 
Progress. Alternatively, some scenarios call for delays of thirty years, which. 
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the NRC might set as the maximum, or for delays up to 100 years prior to dis-
mantlement. Perpetual mothballing or .entombment, although probably not accept-
able, would necessitate indefinite annual expenditures. Exactly what time 
periods will be involved is uncertain. Facility owners are presently allowed 
considerable latitude, and regulatory changes have not yet limited the range 
of choices. 
In any case, although available cost estimates are current, the expendi-
ture will occur far in the future complicating the task of estimating future 
costs and the revenue requirements to pay for deconnnissioning. Various uncer-
tainties have already been identified in Part II of this report. However, it 
is worth reiterating that the rate of inflation, interest, and tax policy are 
important considerations. The net effect on costs of these and other factors 
is unclear, but thirty or more years of inflation, even at 5 to 7 percent will 
escalate costs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. 42 Assuming higher 
rates for inflation adds substantially to final costs for decommissioning. 
To accurately anticipate decommissioning costs, estimates must be period-
ically updated over the life of the facility. To adequately fund decommission-
ing from revenues generated during the facility's operating life, revenue re-
quirements and financing mechanisms must be likewise adjusted to reflect chang-
ing factors. Failure to do so opens the door for additional changes in costs 
and revenue needs after the facility has closed and at a time when the only 
source of revenue will be non-benefiting ratepayers or the public. 
(3) Uncertain Solvency of Facility Owner 
Under NRC regulations the obligation to carry out decommissioning falls to 
the licensee owning the reactor. Given the concern for accomplishing decom-
missioning and doing so in an equitable manner, it is worth questioning "the 
future ability of utilities to pay the future costs of decommissioning ••• 1143 
Ownership patterns vary. Examples of reactor owners are publicly-owned 
utilities, investor-owned utilities, agencies or corporations of states or the 
federal government, joint ownership by several utilities (possibly from differ-
ent states), or some combination of these alternatives. The Battelle study for 
the NRC listed operating or planned power reactors as 81 percent investor-owned 
and 19 percent publicly-owned. 44 
The financial integrity and future solvency of these owners depends in 
part on the economics of nuclear power. Demand for electricity, the cost of 
fuel, charges for waste disposal, and the attractiveness of other power options 
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affect the ability to generate revenues and finance deconnnissioning nuclear 
Plants. Accidents can also affect the cost of operation and the cost, timing, 
and financing of decommissioning. General Public Utilities, owner of the Three 
Mile Island plant, declared itself in danger of insolvency shortly after the 
accident at TMr. 45 
On the other hand, it is argued that the question of future solvency is 
not an issue because the relatively sheltered status of publicly regulated u-
tilities gives them the right to earn a fair rate of return, even under adverse 
economic situations. Utilities, the argument concludes, will therefore contin-
ue to have the ability to generate revenues sufficient to cover decommission-
. 46 
ing. Even so, the Public Interest Research Group, some regulators, anct others 
have taken the opposite view arguing that relying solely on the facility owner 
Provides an insufficient guarantee of the adequacy and availability of funds. 
In addition, an NRC draft report (discussing financing options and acknowledg-
ing the special status of regulated utilities) states that relying on an un-
funded reserve (one financing approach) "is so fraught with uncertainty as to 
be questionable under the NRC's responsibility to assure that a utility is 
financially qualified to safety shut down a licensed reactor. 1147 This state-
ment, though not NRC policy, reflects the view that leaving the funding ques-
tion stri·ctly to the ·1· · · · d · bl d h d f uti ities is ina visa e an suggests t e nee or some 
sort of guarantees to strengthen the assurance of fund availability. 
(4) Premature Shut-down· 
Nuclear facilities may be closed prematurely for a variety of reasons. 
Three Mile Island demonstrates the possibility of an accident-related shut-
down. Th e NRC has closed, at least tentatively, other plants upon discovering 
design f 1 48 au ts or unstable geological characteristics at the site. 
An accident might radically escalate cost estimates and alter the decom-
missioning timetable. Converting the damaged TMI reactor to fossil fuel gen-
erat· 49 
_ ion, for example, could cost $1.4 to $1.7 billion. Returning it to 
nuclear service was by August 1980 estimated at more than $800 million. The 
Pre-accide t · f d · · · $95 · 11 · n estimate o ecommissioning costs was mi ion. 
On the other hand, premature closure for other reasons might reduce esti-
mates by taking the reactor out of operation before it builds .up the intense 
leve1 f 
s O radiation associated with a full operating life. 
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Further, even the normal operating lifetime of a reactor is not firmly 
established. None has completed the expected life cycle at this time, and con-
sequently, no hard data exists to demonstrate the number of years of operation 
to expect from today's large commercial reactors. 50 
Planning a financing mechanism to generate sufficient decommissioning 
funds during the lifetime of the reactor is complicated by qncertainties re-
lated to the possibility of premature shut-down and the accuracy of the expec-
tation of thirty to forty years of operation. 51 
Criteria for Financing Mechanisms 
The foregoing discussion of decommissioning offers guidance in selecting 
criteria for evaluating alternative funding mechanisms. Additionally, prin-
ciples of economics and public service regulation relate to the question. How-
ever, there appears to be more agreement about applicable criteria than on the 
implications and ranking of those criteria for the choice of a financing mech-
anism. 
Briefly, the criteria cover the (1) sufficiency, (2) availability, (3) 
equitable distribution, and (4) cost of decommissioning funding. 52 Each.is 
stated and discussed below. 
(1) Sufficiency 
Sufficient funds must be collected to cover the full costs of decommission-
ing. To accomplish this, financing mechanisms used must be adjustable to 
accommodate changing cost estimates, which reflect technology, regulation, and 
inflation. 
(2) Availability 
Adequate funds should be available at the time of decommissioning. Concern 
over availability arises from questions about future existence and solv~ncy of 
the facility owner. It is also important in the event of a premature shut-down 
of the facility, which might interrupt some funding mechanisms. The first point 
may be interpreted to mean the facility owner or utility should not be the cus-
todian of collected decommissioning funds. The second implies the need for 
either prepayment of full costs or some form of bonding or insurance to assure 
both the sufficiency and availability of funding. Wood's analysis of the fi-
nancing issues for the NRC ranked assurance of the availability of funds as the 
most important criteria for selecting an appropriate financing mechanism, and 
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Chapman preferred a funded method for that reason. Both sufficiency and avail-
ability are important and related criteria. 
(3) Equitable Distribution 
Considerations of equity require that the beneficiaries (users) of the 
electricity generated by a nuclear plant bear the full cost of decommissioning 
that plant. A suitable financing mechanism should avoid shifting the cost bur-
den to future, non-benefiting generations. Additionally, it should ensure that 
the cost is shared equitably among users during the productive life of the fa-
cility. Although fully matching estimates and revenues to actual cost may not 
be possible, pursuit of this objective will minimize the discrepancy and the 
Potential impact on non-benefiting ratepayers or the public. 
(4) ~ 
The financing mechanism with the lowest cost consistent with satisfying 
all other criteria should be selected.- Some utilities have argued that this, 
rather than assurance, is the most important criteria. That assertion may re-
flect their view that assurance is no problem due to their sheltered status 
as Well as the point that consumers deserve the best deal they can get. How-
ever, if a high ,degree of importance is attached to the sufficiency, availabil-
ity, and equity criteria, it is not appropriate to choose among financing al-
ternatives solely on the basis of cost. It should be recognized that guaran-
tee· · ' J.ng, to some reasonable extent, that these criteria will be satisfied will 
Probably involve addition~! costs. However, at least one study indicates that 
the choice of financing method has "little or no economic significance" in the 
total cost of 1 . . 53 e ectricity. 
Alternat. F. . 
- l.Ve inancing Mechanisms 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly analyze and compare 
alternat· f" 54 ive ianncing mechanisms for the purpose of choosing among them. 
This discussion attempts to outline bas·ic approaches, list alternative mechan-
isms d 
'an offer some comments. Ultimately, the choice of a specific mechanism 
must be carefully assessed d · · f · 1 · h · to etermine its per ormance in re ation tote cri-
teria . 
set forth earlier. 
In addition, federal income tax policy is one other factor affecting the 
cost of alternati·ve decommissioning financing mechanisms. The Internal Rev~ 
enue s 
ervice allows deductions ag;:iinst income taxes for depreciation of capital. 
assets b . 
ut regards decommissioning as an expense that can only be deducted when 
57 
it is incurred. Accruals during the service life of the facility to build up 
a decommissioning fund are taxable although credits would be extended once the 
expenditures occur. The need to pay income taxes on accruals and fund earnings 
raises the cost to consumers. However, an NRC analysis indicates that the IRS 
will allow, on a case by case basis, annual deductions for decommissioning 
accruals under certain circumstances. Essentially, funds must be immediately 
segregated from the utility's assets, placed in a blind trust not controlled 
. . d . d . . . 55 Wh h h. ld by the utility, an investe in tax exempt securities. et er tis cou 
happen has been disputed by Northern States Power Company which concluded that 
the IRS would probably not permit such exemptions. 56 
Four basic approaches exist for funding decommissioning: 
• paying the cost when incurred and subsequently recov-
ering the cost; 
• collecting sufficient funds gradually over the expect-
ed life of the facility; 
• prepaying the cost into a special fund prior to oper-
ation and then recovering that expense during the life 
of the facility; and 
• use of bonding or insurance in conjunction with one of 
the first three approaches. 
f 
t 
V 
t 
Various specific financial and accounting mechanisms are available to implement y 
these approaches and enable a utility to recover its costs. Each entails dif- ~ 
ferent implications for consumers, facility owners, and the public. The options t: 
briefly discussed below are: (1) expensing, (2) depreciation, (3) funded mech- nE 
anisms, and (4) bonding and insurance. 
(1) Expense Costs as Incurred 
Under this method, the utility defers funding decommissioning until the 
costs are incurred in the future. The actual expenditure is amortized and 
recovered from revenues in the years during and after decommissioning. The 
GAO study, mentioned earlier, reported that 15 of 32 utilities surveyed planned 
to recover costs in this manner. 
Expensing the costs presents two problems. First, .it depends on the fu-
ture solvency of the utility and its capacity to generate sufficient funding. 
Second, it requires future ratepayers who have not benefited from the operation 
of the facility to pay for decommissioning. For these reasons, it appears un-
acceptable and has been rejected in several studies. However, if actual costs 
incurred during decommissioning exceed the amounts estimated and accumulated 
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during the life of the plant, those added costs will be amortized and paid by 
future, nonbenefiting ratepayers. 
(2) Depreciation Mechanisms 
A depreciation mechanism collects funds gradually over the life of the 
Plant. Normally, it enables the owner to recover a portion of the plant's or-
iginal capital cost in each year of operation. Depreciation schedules for 
nuclear plants run approximately 27 to 30 years depending on what time is cer-
t. f. 1 l.ed by the supervising public service regulator. Establishing the number 
of Years for depreciation of a nuclear plant is complicated by the lack of any 
complete histories for large commercial reactors. 
Decommissioning expenses may be incorporateµ in a plant's depreciation 
schedule in what is known as a salvage adjustment. At the end of its life, a 
facility is not necessarily totally worthless. The sale of scrap building ma-
terials or equipment generates a salvage value. However, in the case of nuclear 
facilities, contaminated materials must be disposed of rather than sold, and 
this is the cost of decommissioning. Disposal expenses in excess of salvage 
Values constitute negative net salvage value, a net cost the utility must pay 
to d · 1.spose of the facility. 
Adding an estimate of negative net salvage and the original capital cost 
Yields . 
an amount that may be depreciated to recover both the original capital 
and the net disposal cost. Recovery is accomplished by building the deprecia-
t. / 
1.on Schedule into the rates charged to consumers. The technique is called 
negative net salvage value depreciation. 57 
On the utility's books, funds collected for decommissioning could be lump-
ed together with recovered capital cost, as accumulated depreciation, or iden-
tified in a separate account. The latter approach would highlight the amount 
accrued for decommissioning and might facilitate adjusting accrual rates for 
changing estimates of costs and salvage. 58 
Typically, funds recovered through -depreciation are retained by the util-
ity. 
The company is free to use the monies as it sees fit, and in fact, pro-
v·d 1 ing a utility with interim funds has been seen as an attractive feature of 
this approach.59 Consequently, with this approach the availability of future 
fundi f 
ng or decommissioning would depend on the solvency of the utility. 
Alternatively, depreciation accruals for decommissioning could be paid 
into a f . 
und and restricted to use for- future decommissioning. Such a fund 
cou1a b . . 
e W1.th1.n, or outside, of the utility. 
59 
The amount of funds collected under depreciation would not be sufficient 
to cover the cost of decommissioning in the event of a premature shut-down of 
the facility. Only near the ·end of the schedule do accumulations begin to 
approach the full cost of decommissioning. This problem might be resolved by 
using a bond or some form of insurance to cover the deficiency when routinely 
accumulating funds are insufficient. 
Depreciation mechanisms must also be evaluated in terms of equity. Some 
formulas would cause raLepayers early in the life of the facility to pay more 
in real terms than ratepayers later in the operating life. Other methods, ad-
justed to price level rather than straight line, would correct this problem 
but result in high nominal accruals in later years. In addition, depreciation 
accruals are not normally tax deductible. This raises the cost of setting a-
side decommissioning monies. Further, tax treatment may place a tax burden 
on current ratepayers while giving a tax break to future ratepayers when the 
expenditure is incurred and deducted at the time of decommissioning. 
(3) Funded Mechanisms 
Funded mechanisms accumulate and set aside real assets for the sole pur-
pose of decommissioning. The utility recovers its payments to the fund from 
rates paid by its customers over the life of the facility. The monies gener-
ated may be held either by the utility in a special account, or alternatively, 
transferred to a trust until required for decommissioning. The latter approach 
minimizes reliance on the future solvency of the utility. 
Funded mechanisms may be of at least two types: prepaid lump sum or an 
annual payment sinking fund. 
PREPAID LUMP SUM: This option requires the utility to pay a lump sum into 
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the fund prior to operating the reactor. Properly calculated, this amount com- thi 
bined with investment returns over the life of the fund should be sufficient to 
cover decommissioning costs and minimize the potential burden on future rate-
payers. The prepaid lump sum has the advantage of forcing the investor to 
weigh the cost of decommissioning iI\ the choice of nuclear power over alterna-
60 tive power sources. 
car 
ger 
SINKING FUND: A sinking fund requires the utility to make an annual pay- Cle 
ment to a decommissioning fund. The amount of this annuity is calculated by 
estimating removal costs, inflation, and return on invested funds. When 
accumulated and combined with investment earnings, these annual payments should 
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equal the future cost of decommission~ng. However, equal annual payments might 
be inequitable because the real value of early contributions would be relative-
ly greater than those of later ratepayers. To avoid this, the design might 
St. 
rive to equalize the real value of payments at different points of time. 
Neither mechanism would provide sufficient funds in the event of prema-
ture shut-down. 61 The value of the fund approximates the full cost of decom-
missioning only near the end of the facility's operating life. 
Both funds could be adjusted periodically to account for changing esti-
mates of cost, inflation, and earnings. To mitigate this problem might require 
some form of bond or insurance. 
The cost of funded approaches depends on several factors. Among them are: 
ivhether annual payments to the fund are tax deductible; whether fund investments 
are in tax exempt securities; and what opportunity costs are involved with a 
Particular mechanism. 
(4) Bonding and Insurance 
The purpose of requiring a bond is to inpure the sufficiency and avail-
ability of d · · · f d 62 h h · · · . h l"k l"h d f econnnissioning un s. Te tee nique minimizes t e i e i oo o 
the p bl· 
u ic or non-benefiting ratepayers having to assume the costs of decom-
missioning. Bonding or insurance could be required when the utility is the 
Sole custodian of decommissioning funds or to cover fund deficiencies in the 
event of Premature shut-down. As pointed out earlier, the NRC found that bonds 
of $SQ million over~ forty year period are currently unavailable. Additionally, 
because of renewal procedures used by bonding companies, long term assurance is 
not nece · 
ssarily guaranteed. Alternatively, some form of insurance in conjunc-
tion With a parti·cular fundi"ng· · ld "d d t h th option cou provi ea equa e assurance wen e 
Utility • 
is custodian of the deconnnissioning funds or cover fund deficiencies in 
the event of premature shut-down. 63 
~ 
Accomplishing deconnnissioning requires foresight and planning. Deferring 
consideration of financing implies a serious disregard for the welfare of future 
generations that will be forced to bear the cost. Current beneficiaries of nu-
clear Power should do no . less than pay its full cost. 
Sett· 
ing up satisfactory financing arrangements is a complicated task. Sev-
era1 st 
eps are involved: 
• determining the preferred method of decommissioning; 
61 
• estimating the future cos.ts associated with that 
method; 
o devising an equitable mechanism for collecting 
sufficient funds to meet decommissioning costs~ 
• providing means for adjusting the funding mech-
anism to accommodate changing estimates and 
economic circumstances and; 
• incorporating adequate guarantees that the task 
of decommissioning will be carried out. 
While the federal government and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are 
major actors in determining the proper methods for waste disposal and decommis~ 
sioning, the states and their respective public service regulators play major 
roles in dealing with the financing problem. 
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COMMENT 
PART IV 
CONCLUSION 
Policy studies often conclude with an ardent plea for further study. For-
mulating sound policy recommendations is always more difficult than describing 
policy problems. Calling for more study can be a way to avoid this difficult 
task, but it can also reflect a recognition of the true nature of policy prob-
lems: they lack closure. Answers inevitably lead to new questions; solutions 
create new problems. 
We would not be so pretentious as to believe that we have written the de-
finitive paper on nuclear power plant decommissioning. We have attempted only 
to provide an introduction to decommissioning which helps those who want to 
think about the subject as a policy issue. Therefore, if this paper stimulates 
further questions and study, it will fulfill its purpose. 
But we will not eschew the task of setting forth our policy recommenda-
tions based on our conclusions from this analysis. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nuclear Wastes and Decommissioning 
Federal agencies have issued over 5,000 reports on nuclear waste problems. 
There is general agreement on two points. First, underground storage is the 
most technically feasible alternative for high level wastes. Second, for both 
high- and low-level wastes, the most difficult problems are not technical but 
political (that is, siting of disposal facilities). 
As the federal government develops nuclear waste policies, more explicit 
consideration must be given to decommissioning. The ramifications of specific 
waste storage decisions on decommissioning must be examined carefully and in-
tegrated into overall waste storage policy. 
We believe the most effective step that states can take is to require 
utilities, owning existing or proposed nuclear ~lants, to submit plans on de-
commissioning and on waste disposal. Further, states should not permit new 
nuclear plants unless the utilities can demonstrate that they can safely and 
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permanently dispose of all nuclear wastes as they are generated, safely decom-
mission the plant, and adequately guarantee the financing of both. Most impor-
tant, states also should press the federal government for an effective, not 
merely expedient, solution to the permanent disposal of nuclear wastes. 
This approach will help focus public attention on the problems of decom-
missioning and nuclear wastes by generating utility proposals, public hearings, 
and ongoing discussion. 
Nuclear Plant Design 
There is no ideal way to decommission a nuclear power plant. One reason 
for this, according to the Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD), is that decommission-
ing has not been considered in the design of nuclear plants. 
Studies should be undertaken to illuminate the possible relationships and 
trade-offs between design cri.teria which would facilitate decommissioning and 
those which emphasize other factors (such as, plant operations, safety, and 
total cos ts). 
Decommissioning Methods 
Current NRC regulations permit utilities to choose a decommissioning meth-
od. The NRC allows mothballing, entombment, and dismantlement. We believe 
that permanent mothballing and entombment are unacceptable, and the NRC should 
not permit them. They leave plant structures standing which remain radioactive 
for thousands of years, and in our judgment, this entails far too many uncer-
tainties and potential long-term risks. 
Based upon current cost estimates, decommissioning technology, and radia-
tion exposures, prompt dismantlement for plant& in operation thirty to forty 
years can be seriously questioned as well, This method creates larger quanti-
ties of radioactive waste material than any other method and poses the greatest 
occupational health hazards. It is also the most expensive according to most 
cost studies. The risks and costs of dismantlement may be greater than the 
potential benefits of completely clearing the plant site within five to eight 
years after shutdown. 
We believe that mothballing/delayed dismantlement and entombment/delayed 
dismantlement may strike the best balance between decommissioning costs, in-
stitutional and land use considerations, and public and occupational health and 
safety. They should be included in NRC regulations as approved decommission-
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ing alternatives. However, it is clear that further cost-benefit analysis of 
the tradeoffs between alternatives will be necessary in order to make an in-
formed decision. Also, the NRC should revise its regulations so that the pro-
cedures for decommissioning, including surveillance and maintenance, are set 
forth more explicitly. 
Financing 
It is our conclusion that NRC and state regulatory policy must include 
arrangements for financing decommissioning. Ambiguity about preferable methods 
and standards for decommissioning exacerbates the task of developing accurate 
cost estimates on which to build suitable financing mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
implementing an acceptable financing scheme at the earliest possible date is 
the only means of ensuring that the costs of decommissioning will be reflected 
in the cost of nuclearpower to current beneficiaries. 
We believe current cost estimates may be used as the basis for financing 
arrangements provided allowance is made for periodic adjustment to reflect 
changing cost estimates. Financing arrangements can be established at this 
time by state public service regulators. 
Our review of decommissioning and financing issues suggests the following 
criteria for selecting a financing method: 
1) Current charges for nuclear generated electricity should 
reflect the future cost of decommissioning and waste dis-
posal. 
2) The mechanism adopted should allow periodic adjustment to 
reflect changing cost estimates. 
3) Funds for decommissioning should be guaranteed prior to 
licensed operation of a commercial nuclear power plant. 
4) Decommissioning funds, as collected, should be placed in 
a secure account specifically set as~de for that purpose. 
Finally, it is our conclusion that, while provision of least-cost financing 
and equitable treatment of consumers are important considerations, the most 
fundamental concern must be for public health and safety. This suggests that 
assigning responsibility for decommissioning, specifying proper methods, and 
assuring adequate financing are the most important criteria to be applied. 
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APPENDIX A 
INVENTORY OF NUCLEAR WASTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(as of 1/ 1/ 77) 
HIGH LEVEL WASTE (thousands of cubic feet) 
Commercial 
DOE 
Total 
80 
9,400 
9,480 
COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL (metric tons of heavy metal) 
2,300* 
TRANSURANIC WASTE (kilograms) 
Commercial 
DOE 
Total 
123 
1,100 
1,223 
LOW LEVEL WASTE (millions of cubic-feet) 
Commercial 
DOE 
Total 
15.8 
37.8 
53. 6 
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS (million tons) 
140 
Source: Intragency Review Group (IRG) on Nuclear Waste Management, Report 
to the President (Washington, D.C., March 1979), p. 11 and Appepdix n,p:-· 
28. 
*Amount more than doubles for 1980. 
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CASE I 
Year Annual 
1977 1,000 
1978 1,100 
1979 1,300 
1980 1,300 
1981 1,400 
1982 1,600 
1983 1,900 
1984 2,200 
1985 2,700 
1986 2,900 
1987 3,400 
1988 3,600 
1989 3,700 
1990 3,700 
1991 3,800 
1992 3,800 
1993 3,800 
1994 3,800 
1995 3,700 
1996 3,700 
1997 3,700 
1998 3,600 
1999 3,600 
2000 3,500 
APPENDIX B 
SPENT FUEL ACCUMULATIONS 
(metric tons of heavy metal) 
Cumulative Annual 
3,300 1,000 
4,400 1,100 
5,700 1,300 
7,000 1,300 
8,400 1,400 
10,000 1,900 
11,900 1,900 
14,100 2,200 
16,800 2,700 
19,700 2,900 
23,100 3,400 
26,700 3,600 
30,400 3,900 
34,100 4,200 
37,900 4,600 
41,700 4,900 
45,500 5,200 
49,300 5,700 
53,000 6,000 
56,700 6,500 
60,400 6,900 
64,000 7,300 
67,600 7,800 
71,100 8,100 
CASE II 
Cumulative 
3,300 
4,400 
5,700 
7,000 
8,400 
11,900 
11,900 
14,100 
16,800 
19,700 
23,100 
26,700 
30,600 
34,800 
39,400 
44,300 
49,500 
55,200 
61,200 
67,700 
74,600 
81,900 
89,700 
97,800 
Case I: Nuclear generating capacity in the year 2000 equals 148 gigawatts. 
Case II: 380 gigawatts. 
(A gigawatt equals 1 million kilowatts.) 
Source: Interagency Review Group (IRG) on Nuclear Waste Management, 
Report to the President (Washington, D.C., Y~rch 1979), Appendix D, p. 28. 
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APPENDIX C 
ESTIMATED TIMETABLE FOR 
COMMERCIAL REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING 
Decommissioning Begins By Number of 
Year Total 
2000 5 
2005 11 
2010 49 
2015 81 
2020 140 
These estimates are based on: 
Reactors 
Additional 
6 
38 
32 
59 
(1) an assumption of a 35-year lifetime for commercial reactors; 
(2) an assumption that there will be no accidents requiring unscheduled, 
permanent reactor shut-downs; 
(3) various estimates on the number of nuclear power plants scheduled to 
commence operations by 1985. 
Source: compiled by Dave Aquilina. 
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Year 
1979 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
APPENDIX D 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND THE YEAR 
THEIR ON-SITE SPENT FUEL STORAGE 
REACHES FULL CAPACITY 
Plant Utility 
Lacross~ Dairyland Power 
Cooperative 
Surry 1 Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. 
H.B. Robinson Carolina Power & Light 
Co. 
Brunswick 1 Carolina Power & Light 
Co. 
Brunswick 2 Carolina Power & Light. 
Co. 
Calvert Cliffs 1 Baltimore Gas & 
Electric 
Calvert Cliffs 2 Baltimore Gas & 
Electric 
Prairie ls,land 1 Northern States Power 
Prairie Island 2 Northern States Power 
Yankee Rov;re Yankee Atomic Power Co. 
Humboldt Bay Pacific Gas & Electric 
Midland 1 Consumers Power Co. 
Midland 2 Consumers Power Co. 
State 
---
·Wisconsin 
Virginia 
?· Carolina 
N. Carolina 
N. Carolina 
Maryland 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Minnesota 
Massachusetts 
California 
Michigan 
Michigan 
Source: Nuclear Assurance Corporation, as cited in Robert J. Samuelson, 
"Now That We've Got the Reactors, What Do We Do With the Us~d-Up Fuel?" 
National Journal~ 5 November 1977, p. 1730. 
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APPENDIX E 
TOTAL COMMERCIAL LOW LEVEL WASTE 
(millions of cubic feet) 
CASE I 
Total Reactors & Non-Fuel 
D & D1 Year Fuel Cycle Cycle Ann. Cum. 
1980 2.87 1.0 0 3.87 14.26 
1985 2.15 1.5 0 3.65 29.97 
1990 1.03 2.0 0 3.03 45.03 
1995 1.03 2.5 0 3.53 62.68 
2000 1.03 3.0 0.01 4.04 82.84 
1/ Decommissioning and Decontamination: 5 reactors mothballed. 
2/ 3 At 275,000 ft /acre 
CASE II 
Total Reactors & Non-Fuel 
Dl Year Fuel Cycle Cycle D & Ann. Cum. 
1980 2.87 1.0 0 3.87 14.26 
1985 5.98 I 1.5 0 7.48 44.40 
1990 9.14 2.0 0 11.14 93.60 
1995 13.28 2.5 0.1 15.88 164.24 
2000 17.84 3.0 0.1 20.94 260.00 
1/ Decommissioning and Decontamination: 5 reactors dismantled. 
2/ 3 At 275,000 ft /acre 
Case I: 148 gigawatt capacity in 2000. 
Case II: 380 gigawatt capacity in 2000. 
Burial 
Acres 2 
Required 
51.85 
108.98 
163.75 
227.93 
301. 24 
Burial 
Acres 2 
Required 
51.85 
161.45 
340.36 
597.24 
94~.45 
Source: Interagency Review Group (IRG) on Nuclear Waste Management, 
Report to the President (Washington, D.C., March 1978), Appendix D, p. 8. 
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APPENDIX F 
COST ESTIMATES FOR NUCLEAR 
WASTE MANAGEMENT TO THE YEAR 2000 
(billi9ns of undiscounted, constant 1977 dollars) . 
High Level Waste Repositories 
Away-From-Reactor Storage 
Low Level and Transuranic 
Waste Operations 
High Level Waste Treatment 
DOE Transportation 
Subtotal 
DOER & D Programs 
Contingency 
Total Costs 
CASE I 
3.0 - 3.8 
0.7 - 0.9 
0.6 - 0.9 
4.2 - 5.2 
1.0 - 1.2 
9.5 -12.0 
1.5 - 1. 7 
2.0 - 3.0 
13.0 -16,7 
Case I: 148 gigawatt capacity in 2000. 
Case II: 380 gigawatt capacity in 2000. 
CASE II 
5.6 - 7.3 
0.7 - Q.9 
1.8 - 2.4 
3.5 - 4.4 
1.9 - 2.1 
13.5 -17.1 
1.5 - 1.7 
3.0 - 4.0 
18.0 - 22.8 
Source: Interagency Review Group (IRG) on Nuclear Waste Management, 
Report to· the President (Washington, D.C., March 1979), Appendix D, p .. 32. 
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APPENDIX G 
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COP.UmOGIOrJ 
Juna 1974 
GUL O [ay,, n -• 
DlflECTORATE OF REGULATORY STAl"JDARDS 
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.86 
TERMINATION OF OPERATING LICENSES 
FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Section 50.51. "Duration of license, renewal," of 10 
CFR Part 50. "Licensing of Production and Utilization 
Facilities," requires that each license to operate a 
production and utilization facility be issued for a 
specified duration. Upon expiration of the specified 
period. the license may be either renewed or terminated 
by the Commission. Section 50.82, "Applications for 
termination of licenses." specifies the requirements that 
must be satisfied to terminate an operating license, 
including the requirement that the dismantlement of the 
facility and disposal of the component parts not be 
inimical to the common defense and security or to the 
health and safety nf the public. This guide describes 
n_!etlwJs and procedures considered acceptable by the 
Regulatory staff for the termination of operating 
licenses for nuclear reactors. The Advisory Co1111,,ittce 
on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted com:emmg 
this guide and has concurred in the regulatory position. 
B. DISCUSSION 
When a licensee decides to terminate his nuclear 
reactor operating license. he may, as a first step in the 
process, request that his operating license be amended to 
restrict him to possess but not operate the facility. The 
advantage to the licensee of converting to such a 
possession-only license is reduced surveillance require-
ments in that periodic surveillance of equipment im-
portant to the safety of reactor operation is no longer 
required. Once this possession-only license is issued, 
reactor operation is not permitted. Other activities 
related to cessation of operations such as unloading fuel 
from tht• reactor anJ placing it in storage (either onsite 
of offsite) 111.ry he continued. 
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES 
H-,gul,110,v Gu1d~s arA issued hl d~scr1be and tnJke Bvi11lahle 10 the puhht· 
mrlhod1, ;uCf'!ptahlr hl thf" AEC R.-guldlOry stiff ol implPmf!r111rig ,µenfic pa,u of 
the Comm11,11on'\ ,.-gulat,nns. Hl c.! .. line11e techniqu·PS ,.nf'~ by 1he stall "' 
t!vdlu,1tm9 f.pt'Ct1n: µrotilerns o, µot1uidt6t1 a .. c,denU, or to p,ov1de gu1<1.1nce 10 
appltc.1111s Aegul.nory Guides are not 1uh\tttu1e1 tor regulation~ and compliance 
walh them 1s not r~uuf'd. Methods and 101utions different from thow Sfl uut 1n 
the gu1de1. w•II be ac:cept&ble if 1hey provide a i>as11 for the findings re4umte lo 
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 
Published gwdes will be revised per1od1cally, as appropr1a1e. to accommodatl" 
commenu and to reflec1 new info,rn,at100 or experirnce. 
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A licensee having a possession-only license must 
1ctain, with the Part 50 license, authorization for special 
nuclear matelial (IO CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear 
Material''}, byp1oduct material (10 CFR Part 30, "Rules 
of General Applicability to Licensing of Byproduct 
Material"). an<l s<,urce material (10 CFR Part 40, 
"Lice~tsing of Source Material"), until the fuel, radio-
active components. and sources are removed from the 
facility. Appropriate aJministrative controls and facility 
rcquir.:inents arc imposed by the Part 50 license and the 
teclinic,il spedficatior;,, to assure that proper surveillance 
is pcrformt'd. :!nd that the reJctor facility is maintained 
in a safe cond!tion and not operated. 
A possession-only lil:cnse permits various options and 
procedures for decommissioning. such as mothballing. 
entombment, or dismantling. The requirements imposed 
depend on the option s.:lccted. 
Section 50.8 2 provides that the licensee may dis• 
mantle and dispose of the component parts of a nuclear 
reactor in accordance with existing regulations. For 
research reactors and critical facilities, this has usually 
meant the disassembly of a reactor and its shipment 
offsite. sometimes to another appropriately licensed 
organization for further use. The site from which a 
reactor has been removed must be decontarninJted, as 
necessary. and inspected by the Commission to deter-
mine whether unrestricted access can be approved. In 
the case of nuclear power reactors, dismantling has 
usually been acrnmplislied by shipping fuel offsite, 
making the reactor in(lperable. and disposing of some of 
the radioactive components. 
Radioactive c• ·111p1H1cr-t~ may be either shipped off-
~iti: ror burial at an at1,hori1ed burial ground or secured 
Copies nf ~ubluhffd 1111des rnav ••r etira,nvd hy req!,;e~• ,nd.e,1r11l9 1he d1"Vis1ons 
dt>sue<J to the US. Atomic E,:1H~y Comrnin1on, Wuhin111on, O.C. '20545. 
Attention: Oirec-tor of P•·guiat<•t·-· C'.itand,:tcds. Comments and s~1•_¥:Je1t1on5, for 
1mpr0\l'rmenn in 1he,e gu1dP-; MC' enc.-Hiraged and should be sent to the Sttrftary 
1Jf the Commi,s1on. IJ.S. J\tnmH fn,•rgy Commiuion, Wot1h1ngton, O.C. 20545. 
At1tnt1t,n: Ch1tf, Public P,oc-,•e-drn\)'> S t;~ff. 
Tht guidP.s are tBued ,n the follov~ing 1en broad divi\iOn$· 
1. Power Reactors 6. P,oducts 
2. Rrsearch and Teu RPJctors 7. Transparrati'>n 
3. Fuels ~n<l Materials F ac,litiM 8 Or.cupat1orLal Health 
4. En..,i,onmental and Siting 9. Antitrutt Rev,ew 
5. M111euals and Plant Prottctio11 10. GMneral 
on the site. Those radioactive materials remaining on the 
site must be isolated from the public by physical barriers 
or other means to prevent public access to hazardous 
levels of radiation. Surveillance is necessary to assure the 
long term integrity of the barriers. The amount of 
surveillance required depends upon (I) the potential 
hazard to the health and safety of the public from 
radioactive material remaining on the site and (2) the 
integrity of the physical barriers. Before areas may be 
released for unrestricted use, they must have been 
decontaminated or the radioactivity must have decayed 
to less than prescribed limits (Table I). 
The hazard associated with the retired facility is 
evaluated by considering the amount and type of 
remaining contamination, the d,1gree of confinement of 
the remaining radioactive materials. the physical security 
provided by the confine;nent, the susceptibility to 
release of radiation as a result of nal ural phenomena, 
and the duration of required surveillance. 
C. REGULATORY POSITION 
1. APPLICATION FOR A LICENSE TO POSSESS BlJf · 
NOT OPERATE (POSSESSION•ONLY LICENSE) 
A request to amend an operating license to a 
possession-only license should be made to the Director 
of Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20545. The request should include the 
following information: 
a. A description of the current sta_tus of the facility. 
b. A description of measures that y.,ill be taken tu 
prevent criticality or reactivity changes and to minimize 
releases of radioactivity from the facility. 
c. Any proposed changes to the tcdmical specifica-
tions that reflect the possession-only facility status ~nd 
the necessary disassembly/retirement activities tu be 
performed. 
d. A safety analysis of both the activities to bc 
accomplished and the proposed changes to the technical 
specifications. · 
e. An inventory of activated materials and their 
location in the facility. 
2. ALTERNATIVES FOR REACTOR RETIREMENT 
Four alternatives for retirement of nuclear reactor 
facilities are considered acceptable by the Regulatory 
staff. These are: 
a. Mothballing. Mothballing of a nuclear reactor 
facility consists of putting the facility in a state of 
protective storage. In general, the facility may be left 
intact except that all fuel assemblies and the radioactive 
fluids and waste should be removed from the site. 
Adequate radiation monitoring, environmental surveil-
lance, and appropriate security procedures should be 
established under a possession-only license to ensure that 
the health and safety of the public is not endangered. 
b. In-Place Entombment. In-place entombment -con-
sists of sealing all the remaining highly radioactive or 
contaminated components te.g., the pressure ves5cl and 
reactor internals) within a structure integral with the 
biological shield after having al! fuel assemblies, radio-
active fluids and wastes, and certain selected com-
ponents shipped offsite. The structure should provide 
integrity over the period of time in which signif1cant 
quantities \greater than Table I levels) of raclioactivity 
remain with the material in the entombment. An 
appropriate and continuing surveillance program should 
be established under a possession-only license. 
c. Removal of Radioactive Components and Dis-
mantling. All fuel assemblies, radioactive fluids and 
waste, and other materials having activl!ies above ac-
cepted unrestricted activity levels (Table 1) should be 
removed from the site. The facility owner may then have 
unrestricted use of the site with no requirement for a 
license. If the facility owner st1 desires, the remainder of 
the reactor facility may be dismantled and all vestiges 
removed and disposed of. 
d. Conversion to a New Nuclear System or a Fossil 
Fuel System. This. alternative, which applies only to 
nuclear power plants, utilizes the existing turbine system 
with a new steam supply system. The original nuclear 
steam supply system should be separated from the 
electric generating system and disposed of in accordance 
with one of the previous three retirement alternatives. 
3. SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY FOR THE RE-
TIREMENT ALTERNATIVES WHOSE FINAL 
STATUS REQUIRES A POSSESSION-ONLY 
LICENSE 
A facility which has been licemed under a posses-
sion-only license may contain a significant amount of 
radioactivity in the form of activated and contaminated 
hardware and structural materials. Surveillance and 
commensurate security should be provided to assure that 
tl,e public health and safety are not endangered. 
a. Physical security to prevent imdvertent exposure 
of personnel should be provided by multiple locked 
barriers. The presence of these barriers should make it 
extremely difficult for an unauthorized person to gain 
access to areas where radiation or contamination levels 
exceed those specified in Regulatory Position C.4. To 
prevent inadvertent exposure, radiation areas above 5 
mR/hr, such as near the activated primary system of a 
power plant, should be appropriately marked and should 
not be accessible except by cutting of welded closures or 
the disassembly and removal of substantial structures 
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and/or shielding material. Means such as a remote-
readout intrusion alann system should be provided to 
indicate to designated personnel when a physical barrier 
is penetrated. Security personnel that provide access 
control to the facility may be used instead of the 
physical barriers and the intrusion alarm systems. 
b. The physical barriers to unauthorized entrance 
into the facility, e.g., fences, buildings, welded doors, 
and access openings, should be inspected .at least 
quarterly to assure that these barriers have not deterior-
ated and that locks and locking apparatus are intact. 
c. A facility radiation survey should be perfonned at 
least quarterly to verify that no radioactive material is 
escaping or being transported through the containment 
b_arriers in the facility. Sampling should be done along 
the most probable path by which radioactive material 
such as that stored in the inner containment regions 
could be transported to the outer regions of the facility 
:mu ultimately to the environs. 
d. An environmental radiation survey should be 
performed at least semiannually to verify that no 
signficant amounts of radiation have been released to the 
environment from the facility. Samples such as soil, 
vegetation, and water should be taken at locations for 
which statistical data has been established during reactor 
operations. 
e. A site representative should L~ designated to be 
responsible Jor controlling authorized access into and 
movement within the facility. 
f. Administrative procedures should be established 
for the notification and reporti~g of abnormal occur-
rences such as (I) the entrance of an unauthorized 
person or persons into the facility and (2) a significant 
change in the radiation or contamination levels in the 
facility or the offsite environment. 
g. The following reports should be made: 
(I) An annual report to the Director of Licensing, 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DJ'. 
20545, describing the resuhs of the environmental and 
facility raciation surveys, the status of the facility, and 
an evaluation of the performance of security and 
surveillance measures. 
(2) An abnormal occurrence report to the Regula-
tory Operations Regional Office by telephone within 24 
hours of discovery of an abnonnal occurrence. The 
abnormal occurrence will also be reported in the annual 
report described in the preceding item. 
h. Records or logs relative to the following items 
should be kept and retained until the license is termi-
nated, after which they may be stored with other plant 
records: 
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(I) Environmental surveys, 
(2) Facility radiation surveys, 
(3) Inspections of the physical.barriers, and 
( 4) Abnormal occurrences. · 
4. DECONTAMINATION FOR RELEASE FOR UN-
RESTRICTED USE 
If it is desired to terminate a license and to eliminate 
any further surveillance requirements, the facility should 
be sufficiently decontaminated to prevent risk to the 
public health and safety. After the decontamination is 
satisfactorily accomplished and the site inspected by 
the Commission, the Commission may authorize the 
license to be terminated and the facility abandoned or 
released for unrestricted use. The licensee should per-
form the decontamination using the following guide-
lines: 
a. The licensee should make a reasonable effort to 
eliminate residual contamination. 
b. No covering should be applied to radioactive 
surfaces of equipment or structures by paint, plating, or 
other covering material until it is known that contamina-
tion levels (determined by a survey and documented) are 
below the limits sptcified in Table I. In addition, a 
reasonable effort should be made (and documented) to 
further minimize contamination prior to any such 
covering. 
c. The rndioactivity of the interior surfaces of pipes, 
drain lines, or ductwork should be detP.rmined by 
making measure men ts at all traps and other appropriate 
access points, provided contamination at these locations 
is likely to be representative of contamination on the 
interior of the pipes, drain lines, or ductwork. Surfaces 
of premises, equipment, or scrap which are likely to be 
contaminated but are of such size, construction, or 
location as to make the surface inaccessible for purposes 
of measurement should he assumed to be contaminated 
in excess of the permissabk radiation limits. 
d. Upon request, the Commission may authorize a 
licensee to relinquish possession or control of premises, 
equipment, or scrap having surfaces contaminated in 
excess of the limits specified. This may include, but is 
not limited to, special circumstances such as the transfer 
of premises to another licensed organization that will 
continue to work with radioactive materials. Requests 
for such authorization should provide: 
(1) Detailed, specific information describing the 
premises, equipment, scrap, and radioactive contami-
nants and the nature, extent, and degree of residual 
surface contamination. 
(2) A detailed health and safety analysis indi-
cating that the residual amounts of materials on surface 
areas, together with other considerations such as the 
prospective use of the premises, equipment, or scrap, are 
unlikely t_o result in an unreasonable risk to the health 
and safety of the public. 
e. Prior to release of the premises for unrestricted 
use, the licensee should make a comprehensive radiation 
survey establishing that contamination is within the 
limits ~pecified in Table I. A survey report should be 
filed with the Director of Lkensing, U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, Washington; D.C. 20545, with a copy to 
the Director of the Regulatory Operations Regional 
Office having jurisdiction. The report should be filed at 
lea~t 30 days prior to the pllmned ,date o_f abandonment. 
The survey report should: 
(1) Identify the premises; 
(2) Show that reasonable effort has been made to 
reduce residual contamination to as low as practicable 
levels; 
(3) Describe the scopP. of the survey and the 
general procedures followed; and 
(4) State the finding of the ~iJf'\'CY in units 
specified in Table 1. 
After review of the report, the Commission may 
inspect the facilities to confirm the survey prior t_o 
granting approval for abandonment. 
S. REACTOR RETIREMENT PROCEDURES 
As indicated in Regulatory Position C;2, several 
alternatives are acceptable for reactor facility retirement. 
If minor disassembly or "mothballing" is planned, this 
could be done by the existing operating and mainte-
nance procedures under the license in effect. Any 
planned actions involving an unre\iewed safety question 
or a change jn the technical specifications should be 
reviewed and approved in accordance with the require-
ments of 10 CFR §50.59. 
If major structural changes to radioactive components 
of the facility are planned, such as removal of the 
pressure vessel or major components of the prifl13ry 
$ystem, a dismantlement plan intluding the information 
required by §50.82 should be submitted to the Commis-
sion. A dismantlement plan should be submitted for all 
the alternatives of Regulatory Position C.2 except 
mothballing. Ho\\.::ver, minor disassembly activities may 
still be performed in the absence of such a plan, 
provided they are permitt~d by existing operating and 
maintenance procedures. A dismantlement plan should 
include the following: 
. a.· A description of the ultimate status of the facility 
b~ A description of the dismantling activities and the 
precautions to be taken. 
c. A safety analysis of the dismantling activities 
including any effluents which may be released. 
d. A safety analysis of the facility in its ultimate 
status. 
Upon satisfactory review and approv;il of the dis• 
mantling plan, a dismantling order is issued by the 
C'Jmmission in accordance with §50.82. When dis-
mantling is completed and the Commission has been 
notified by letter, the appropriate Regulatory Opera• 
tions Regional Office inspects the facility and verifies 
completion in accordance with the dismantlement plan. 
If residual radiation lev~fa do· not exceed the values in 
Table I, the Commission may terminate the license. If 
these levels are exceeded, the licensee retains the 
possession-only license under which the dismantling 
activities have been conducted or, as an alternative, may 
make application to the State (if an Agreement State) 
for a byproduct materials license. 
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TABLE I 
ACCEPTABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS 
NUCLIDEa AVERAGEbc . MAXIMlJMb d REMOVABLEb e 
U-nat, U-235, U-238, and 5,000 dpm a/100 cm2 15,000 dp_m a/100 cm2 1,000 dpm a/ I 00 cm 2 
associated decay products 
Transuranics, Ra-226, Ra-228, 100 dpm/100 cm2 300 dpm/ 100 c~2 20 dpm/100 cm2 
Th-230, Th-228, Pa-231, 
Ac-227, 1-125, 1-129 
Th-nat, Th-232, Sr-90, 1000 dpm/100 cm2 3000 dpm/100 cm2 200 dpm/ 100 cm2 
Ra-223, Ra-224, U-232, 
1-126, 1-131, 1-133 
Beta-gamma emitters (nuclides 5000 dpm {3--y/100 cm2 15,000 dpm {3--y/100 cm2 1000 dpm {3--y/ 100 c 
with decay.modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneom fission) 
except Sr-90 and others noted above. '. 
3Wbere surface contamination by both alpha• and. beta-gamma-emitting nu elides exists, the limits established for alpha· and 
beta-gamma-emitting nuclides should apply independently. 
bAs used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per niinute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting 
the counts per minute obs~rved by an appropriate detector for background, efficiencr, and geometric factors associated with the 
instrumentation. · · 
CMeasurements of average contaminant should not be avl'ragcd over more than 1 square meter. For objects of less surface area, the 
average should be derived for each such object. 
dThe maximum contamination level applies to an area of not more than 100 cm 2. 
ente amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by wiping that area with dry filter or 
soft absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and usessing the amount of radioactive material on the wipe with an appropriate 
instrument of known efficiency. When removable contaniinatjon on objects of less surface area is determined, the pertinent levels 
should be reduced proportionally and the entire surface should be wiped. 
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APPENDIX H. 
COST ESTIMATES FOR DECOMMfSSIONING 
Cost estimates vary,considerably but will improve !:jlowly as further study 
advances the quality of existing gen~ric studies and provides information con-
cerning the impact of site specif:j..c fqctor9 • Schwent has reported cos~s rang-
ing from $35 million to $128.5 million for.dismantlement. 1 In 1977, complete 
dismantlement of Three Mile Island Units I and II was estimated to cost appro~-
imately $95 million each. Nor~heast Utilifies' Millstone .I a11d II were esti-
mated at $59 miliion each. San Onofre Unit I was estimated, in 1977, at $6~-
$78 million for dismantlement. Chapman, in a study for the California Energy 
Commission, used conventional estimates based on generic studies, but argued 
that estimates on the order of 25 percent qf capital cost would be more reason-
able.2 A 1979 Edison Electric Institute survey of selected utilities revealed 
estimates for decommissioning, method unspecified, ranging from lows of $10-20 
million to around $60 million. 3 However, several estimates also approached 
$100 million. 
Clearly, estimates for rate-making purposes require thorough site specific 
analysis and periodic updating. Other parts of this appendix report costs 
estimated by generic studies and Northern States Power Company. 
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1. AIF STUDY COST ESTIMATES 
Estimated Costs 
(millions of dollars) 
Decommissioning Method 1975 1978i, 
Prompt dis man tlemen t 
• nuclear facilities only 20.3 30.3 
• non-radioactive facilities 6.6 9.9 
Mothballing 
0 preparations 2.3 3.4 
Ii annual surveillance . 08- .167 .12-.25 
Entombment 
• preparations 7.4 11. l 
Q annual surveillance .058 .09 
Mothballing/ delayed dis man tlemen t 
at 108 years 
II nuclear facilities only 13. 3-21. 8 20-33 
Entombment/delayed dismantlement 
at 108 years 
• nuclear facilities only 15:2 22.7 
~·,Notes: Estimates are for a 3411 MWt/1144 MWe pressurized water reactor 
(PWR). The 1975 estimates do not include a 25 percent contingency. To 
facilitate comparison with Battelle!s estimates the second column here 
reports estimates inclusive of a 25 • percent contingency and raised to 
1978 price levels using the ,implicit GNP deflater (Business Conditi~ns 
Digest, April.1980, p. 8, Table 1). This procedure understates actual 
1978 levels if costs associated with the nuclear industry and decomm-
issioning have risen more rapidly than the general price level. The 
range of costs associated with mothballing options reflects differing 
degrees of security and surveillance. The AIF study also estimates 
costs for decommissioning a 3579 MWt/1178. MWe boiling water reactor 
(BWR). These are slightly higher ci1an for PWR dismantl~ment. The 
original 1975 estimates were $26.4 million (nuclear) and $4.8 million 
(non-radioactive), and in 1978 with the 25 percent contingency, they 
are $39.4 million and $7.2 million respectively. Costs for other op-
tions are roughly similar to those for a PWR. Cost reductions for 
dismantlement of a smaller, 550 MWeplant are 18 percent (PWR) and 20 
percent (BWR). · 
Source: Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), An Engineering Evaluation of 
Nuclear Power Reactor Decommissioning Alternatives: Summary Report. 
(AIF/NESP-009SR). Prepared by William J. Marion and Thomas S. LaGuardia, 
Nuclear Energy Services, Incorporated. (Washington D.C.: Atomic Indus-
trial Forum; November 1976), pp. 11-14. 
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2. BATTELLE NORTHWEST LABORATORY COST ESTIMATES 
Decommissioning Method· 
Immediate dismantlement 
• nuclear facilities only 
• non-radioactive facilities 
• spent fuel shipment 
$ deep geological ptorage of some 
decommissioning waste (potential) 
Safe storage 
o preparations 
• annual surveillance 
Safe storage/deferred dismantlement 
(nuclear facilities only) 
• 30 ye4rs 
• 50 years 
• 100 years 
Entombment 
• with reactor internals 
~ reactor internals removed 
• arpmal surveillai1c:e 
o storage to 100 years 
(final disposition not included) 
• with internals 
0 without internals 
Estimated Cost:s 
(millions of dollars) 
1978 
31.0 
8.0 
3.1 
2.3 
9.5 
.08 
40.8 
35.8 
39.8 
21.0 
24.7 
.04 
25.0 
28.7 
Notes: Estimates are for a 3500 MWt/1175 MWe PWR and include a 25 per-
cent contingency factor. Costs for a BWR are expected to be roughly 
similar. Battelle has developed a set of scalipg factors for adjusting 
estimates to smaller plants. Under that system, the estimated cost and 
percentage reductions are as follows for immediate dismantlement: 
Reactor Size Cost;, Percent 
(PWR' s) ~~Wt) (million_~ Reduction>', 
Trojan 3500 31.0 0 
Turkey Point 2550 24.5 21 
R.E. Ginna 1300 16.1 48 
Yankee-Rowe 600 11.3 64 
*Costs do not cover spent fuel disposal or non-radioactive demolition. 
Similar reductions apply to other options and radiation exposures. Trojan 
was used for the original study. 
Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG), Technology, Safety, 
and Costs of Decommissioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power 
Station. NUREG/CR-0130 Addendum. Prepared by Battelle Memorial Insti-
tute, Pacific Nor~hwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. (WashJngton 
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3. 
D.C.: NRC, August 1979, section 2, p. 4, Table 2.1-2 and section 3, p. 
63, Table 3.3-4.) Costs reported earlier, .in Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-0130, 
Appendix H, are similar but lump together nuclear, non-nuclear, and 
spent fuel disposal costs. 
COST ESTIMATES FOR DECOMMISSIONING NORTHERN 
STATES POWER (NSP) NUCLEAR PLANTS 
Decommissioning Method 
Prompt removal/dismantlement 
Total 
Safe storage/entombment/delayed 
dismantlement (after 100 years) 
• entombment 
• dormancy 
• delayed dismantlement 
Subtotal 
Total 
*Corrected for rounding error. 
Cost· Estimates (millions of 1979 dollars) 
Prairie Island 
Unit l unit i Monticello 
51.7 
66.5 
14.0 
9.4 
32.1 
55.5 
72.2 
14.8 
1.7 
3.4 
11.6 
-----
16.7 
54.6 
54.6 
14.5 
9.4 
25.6 
---
49.6* 
Notes: All estimates1 include a 25 percent contingency factor and include 
all plant facilities. Spent fuel removal is included as an undistributed 
cost. Monticello is a 545 MWe ,BWR. Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 are 
both 530 MWe PWR' s -and would be decommissioned sequentially.-
Source: Nuclear Energy Services, Inc. (same organization that did the 
AIF study), Decommissioning Study of the Monticello Nuclear Generating 
Plant, (Revision 1), September 1979, p. 4, and Decommissioning Study of 
Prairie Island Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, (Revision 1), September 
1979, p. 5. These studies were based on the AIF study, regional factors, 
and plant designs. 
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tember 9, 1978, pp. 2-3. Also in NUREG/CP-0003, pp. 294-317. 
2. Chapman, Duane, Nuclear Economics: · Taxation, Fuel Cost and Decommission-
ing, for the California Energy Commission, A.E. Res. 79-26 (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University, Department of Agricultural Economics, October 29, 1979), 
p. 51. 
3. Falletich, Edward L., "A11alysis of Survey on Nuclear Decommissioning and 
Depreciation," a paper pr~sented to the AGA-EEI Depreciation Committee, 
June 25-27, 1979 (Mr. Falletich is with Detroit Edison Company,.Detroit, 
Michigan), pp. 10-11. 
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APPENDIX I 
RADIATION EXPOSURES AND DECOMMISSIONING 
The estimates of radiation exposure to workers and the public vary. Those 
prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission appear below. Estimates made 
for the Atomic Industrial Fqrum study were lower than those reported here. Dif-
ferences arise from the degree of decontamination assumed, work procedures, and 
the. original inventory of radia~ion estimated. The substantial decline in po-
tential exposures over the first century after shutdown is largely attributable 
to the decay of cobalt-60. Subsequently the dose rate is dominated by niobium-
94 and nickel-59 radiation. 
PRINCIPAL RADIONUCLIDES 
The chart below comes from the NRG study of an 1175 MWe pressurized water 
reactor. It shows the major sources of radiation which contribute to the rad-
iation dose rate of the reactor core shroud at shutdown; it does not summarize 
the entire plant, however. The inventory of radionuclides varies with the type 
of material and the material's location, function, and exposure to radiation 
within the plant. 
SELECTED CORE SHROUD RADIOACTIVITY 
AT REACTOR SHUTDOWN 
Half-life Radioactivity External Dose 
Radionuclide (years) Emmission (curies) Rate (R/hr) 
55Fe 2.7 18, y 1.3 X 106 0.11 
60Co 5.3 B, y 9.6 X 105 560,000 
94Nb 20,000 B, y 5.4 2.0 
59Ni 80,000 lB, 2 0.09 y 7 .4 X 10 
Source: NUREG/CP-0003, p. 226 (Report based on Battelle's NRC study, 
NUREG/CR-0130). 
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OCCUPATIONAL AND PUBLIC EXPOSURES 
DECOMMISSIONING ESTIMATED RADIATION DOSES 
(man-rems) 
Occupational Unal-
Mode Decommission Transport Public located Total 
Prompt dismantlement 
Emtombment 
• with reactor internals 
• internals removed 
Safe storage and deferred 
dismantlement 
• preparations 
• storage for: 
30 years 
50 years 
100 years 
• dismantlement at: 
30 years 
50 years 
100 years 
1404 
900 
1000 
426 
103 
16 
21 
14 
22 
4 
4 
3 
14 
14 
14 
30 
2 
1 
1529 
920 
1025 
487 
459 
458 
~··-/ -
Source: NUREG/CR-0130, Addendum, (Battelle Northwest Laboratory), sec. 2, p. 5; 
the percentage of dismantlement occupational dose left after 10 years 
is 26.9 percent; after 30 years, 1.96 percent; and after 50 years, 0.16 
percent (from Addendum, sec. 3, p. 68). 
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APPENDIX J 
STATE ACTION ON DECOMMISSIONING FINANCING 
As already pointed out, a 1977 General Accounting Office·survey indi-
cated that many utilities made no specific·provisions to collect funds during 
the reactor's operational life to cover the future costs of decommissioning. 
That situation reflected several factors. Existing NRC policy on decommission-
ing is very ambiguous leaving a great deal of ~atitude to facility owners. Fur-
ther, potential changes in NRC policy were uncertain then and now, in 1980, 
remain unclear. Also pending policy changes complicated the problem of making 
reasonable cost estimates, a task already open to question due to the lack of 
solid experience and the need for additional engineering studies. It appears, 
in addition, that some utilities expected to amortize the cost of decommission-
ing only after the expenditure. 
REGULATORY ACTION 
In fact, in Pennsylvania this deferred approach was required. State Su-
perior Court rulings prevent the Pennsylvania Public Utilities (PUC) from in-
cluding prospective negative salvage values in depreciation allmvances. 1 It 
was the court's view that removal expenses should be capitalized and amortized 
only after the utility had incurred the co~t. Despite utility petitions; the 
PUC, for a time, was compelled to prohibit negative salvage value depreciation. 
However, in a 1978 rate case, the PUC approved annual expense allowances 
to collect decommissioning funds. Its decision emphasized "vital health and 
safety issues" and the concept that "(t)hose who now enjoy the benefits of this 
technology can do no less than assure that it will not impose an unreasonable 
financial burden on future ratepayers." 
The PUC's approach excludes the costs of removing non~nuclear portions of 
the power plant because they entail no health and safety risks. The required 
funds are estimated periodically, collected annually, and invested as an 
annuity in tax-exempt state bonds that are held in escrow until required for 
decommissioning. Both the annuity and the interest earned are tax exempt. The 
PUC requires adjustment of the annual annuity requirement to reflect changing 
estimates. 
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Other states have not confronted this problem and instead operate on the 
premise that the "customer who benefits from the electricity produced by nu-
clear power pay(s) for all of the costs of nuclear power. 112 Thus even future 
costs such as decommissioning must be calculated and recovered in current rates. 
The Wisconsin Public Service Commission (PSC) includes estimates of net 
salvage values in calculating annual tj.epreciation rates for all electric gen-
erating facilities. 3 The cost of decommissioning is factored in as negative 
net salvage in the depreciation schedule on nuclear facilities. The PSC up-
dates cost estimates periodically. 
The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) applies straight line 
remaining life (SLRL) depreciation allo_wances that include estimates of net neg-
ative salvage values from decommissioning. 4 Decommissioning costs, reflected 
in the rates, are recovered over the depreciated life of the plant. Estimates 
of net salvage are updated to incorporate changes. 
Another California regulator, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District 
(SMUD) which is independent of the PUC, applies straight line total life de-
preciation over 30 years. However, zero salvage value is estimated, and no 
decommissioning funds are collected to cover any excess of costs over salvage. 
The Connecticut Public Utilities Contrdl Authority (PUCA), in a 1977 rate 
case, permitted Connecticut Light and Power to collect funds through deprecia-
tion charges to cover the future cost of mothballing three reactors--Millstone 
I and II and Connecticut Yankee. 5 However, the PUCA also requires the company 
to obtain an annual bond guaranteeing the availability of decommissioning funds 
collected up to that point in time, 
In Minnesota, Northern States Power (NSP) uses negative net salvage value 
depreciation over a 30 year plant life to obtain decommissioning funds. 6 NSP 
operates three reactors at power plants in Minnesota--Monticello and Prairie 
Island (Units I and II). The original total facility cost is placed at $567 
million (in 1979 p~ices). NSP depreciates these plants at 110 perceht of cap-
italized value. The extra ten percent represents the estimated excess of re-
moval costs .over salvage value and was included in depreciation rates certi-
fied by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission in 1978. NSP retains control 
of the collected funds. 
However, in that ruling the Commission also expressed llgrave reservations" 
concerning the appropriateness of the cost estimates and ordered a review of 
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the matter. NSP commissioned an engineering study by Nuclear Energy Services, 
Inc. (NES, also authored the Atomic Industrial Forum generic study) and con-
ducted an in-house economic analysis of alternative financing mechanisms and 
future revenue requirements. As a result NSP estimates immediate dismantle-
ment costs at $121.1 million (1979) for all three facilities. Additionally, 
the utility has requested the PUC to allow recovery of decommissioning costs 
through an internal sinking fund with revenues invested in utility assets. NSP 
would discontinue recovery through the negative salvage values now built into 
its depreciation rates. 
The issues of cost and recovery mechanisms will continue to come before 
state utility regulators in the continuing effort to account for decommission-
ing costs in ways consistent with the financing criteria discussed in Part III. 
Just how much the situation has changed since the 1977 General Accounting 
Office study remains uncertain, although a mid-1979 survey by the Edison Elec-
tric Institute provides some indication. 7 The survey covered twenty-one 
companies, together owning thirty reactors. On average, the estimated reactor 
service life, for depreciation purposes, was just under thirty years. The 
average net salvage ratio was 10.9 percent, with several estimates in excess 
of 20 percent and a few above 30 percent. Twenty of the twenty-one preferred 
cost recovery through an internal depreciation reserve. The preferred method 
of decommissioning varied: mothballing, 2; entombment, 2; prompt removal/dis-
mantlement, 9; entombment with delayed removal dismantlement, 2; and no speci-
fic plans, 4. Cost estimates reported in the survey varied from low estimates 
of $10-20 million to around $60 million. However, estimates for Philadelphia 
Electric's facilities approach $100 million (1979). Estimates for Consumers 
Power's Big Rock and Palisades plants sugg~st how estimates have changed over 
time, at least in some cases. For Big Rock, the 1974 estimate was $2.3 mil-
lion, but the proposed estimate, in 1978 prices, is $31.4 million. For Pali-
sades, the 1974 estimate stood at $8.7 million, but the proposed estimate, in 
1978 prices, is $60.7 million. 
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OTHER STATE ACTION 
State legislatures and legislative committees have also considered the 
decommissioning problem. Vincent Schwent, with the California Energy Commis-
sion has reviewed legislative activities on decommissioning, and the NRC staff 
made available a review of such activity for the authors of this report.B The 
NRC study covers legislative actions but not regulatory actions. However, it 
is unclear in some cases whether proposed or implemented measures apply ex-
plicitly to reactor decommissioning or generally to those handling radioactive 
materials. 
Tennessee authorizes the Commissioner of Public Health to require certain 
classes of licensees who use, store, or handle radioactive materials to post 
a performance bond and to contribute to a perpetual care trust fund (HB-1473, 
signed 3/12/76). Virginia enacted similar requirements (HB-488, signed 4/10/ 
76). Georgia allows the Department of Human Resources to require bonds from 
licensees to assure the availability of funds in the event of abandonment, 
insolvency, or other inability of the licensee to meet Department Requirements, 
and the Division of Environmental Protection may require bonds for permittees 
of radioactive storage, concentration, or burial facilities (I-I-420, approved 
4/16/79). Maine, in June 1979, created a special study commission on decom-
missioning which is scheduled to submit a comprehensive report in January 1981. 
Humerous other proposals, on decommissioning funding, have been introduced 
over the last two years in the legislatures of several states. These range 
from study commissions to requirements for posting bonds equal to at least 30 
percent of the decommissioning cost or 30 percent of the total capital cost 
of the facility. The disposition of these bills is unknown. 
In relation to uranium mining and radioactive waste disposal facilities 
several states have enacted laws. New Mexico permits assessing a fee on yellow 
cake at each uranium mill to fund continuing monitoring and clean-up operations 
after mills close (signed 4/7/77). Arizona requires similar fees as well as 
posting of bonds against abandonment or default (H~2324, approved 6/4/78). 
Illinois requires similar fees to finance a trust fund for perpetual care of 
radioactive waste disposal sites (signed 9/20/77). Legislatures in Wyoming, 
Kansas, Washing ton, and Nevada have also approved monitoring fees, bonds,' or 
perpetual care trust funds for various activities involving radioactive mater-
ials. 
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Legislation also has been proposed to cover funding of post-accident cost 
recovery or premature decommissioning. None was reported passed by the NRC re-
view. 
The difficulty with reviewing legislative activity is that the number and 
variety of proposals can be misleading. Few legislative proposals, on any sub-
ject, finally pass. Many do not even receive substantive hearings. Of those 
that pass, not all are signed by the governor. And of those signed, implemen-
tation is another hurdle to be crossed. Further, what is applicable and appro-
priate for one type of radiation problem, ownership and licensing, and regula-
tory situation may or may not be appropriate for other circumstances. Conse-
quently, legislative "reviews" like those done by Vincent Schwent and the NRC 
indicate increasing legislative activity on decommissioning but must be care-
fully evaluated in order to identify substantive consideration and proposals. 
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GLOSSARY 
Selected abbreviations, acronyms, terms, and definitions related to nuc-
lear energy and directly related to decommissioning work are defined and ex-
plained in this section. The first part contains abbreviations and acronyms, 
and the second part contains terms and definitions. 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AFRs 
AIF 
ALARA 
BWR 
Ci 
DOE 
DOT 
EPA 
FERG 
GAO 
HLW 
HTGR 
IRG 
LWR 
mr 
mrad 
mrem 
MWe 
MWt 
NRG 
OECD 
PIRG 
PWR 
R 
rad 
rem 
SNM 
VDEW 
away from reactor sites 
Atomic Industrial Forum 
as low as reasonably achievable 
boiling water reactor 
curie 
U.S. Department of Energy 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
General Accounting Office 
high level waste 
high temperature gas reactor 
Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management (U.S. 
Department of Energy) 
I 
light water reactor 
milliroentgen 
millirad 
millirem, see rem also 
megawatts, electric (roughly one-third of MWt) 
megawatts, thermal 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Organization for Economic Cooperatio•n and Development 
Public Interest Research Group 
pressurized water reactor 
roentgen 
radiation absorbed dose 
roentgen equivalent man 
special nuclear material 
West German Association of Power Stations 
97 
DEFINITIONS 
Activity: 
Airborne radioactive 
material: 
ALARA: 
Cask: 
Containment building: 
Contamination: 
Curie: 
Decay, radioactive: 
Dose, absorbed: 
Dose, equivalent: 
Sometimes used for the term "radioactivity." 
Radioactive particulates, mists, fumes, and/or gases 
in air. 
A philosophy to maintain exposure to radiation as low 
~sis .E_easonably .:'.!_chievable. 
A heavily shielded shipping container for radioactive 
materials. Some casks weigh.as much as 100 tons. 
A strongly reinforced structure that encloses the nu-
clear steam supply system. Also called reactor build-
ing. 
Radioactive material or materials that have been de-
posited on the surfaces of structures or equipment or 
that have been mixed with another material. 
Thr special unit of activity. One curie equals 3.7 x 
10 O nuclear transformations per second. (Abbreviated 
Ci.) Several fractions of the curie are in common 
usage: 
• millicurie • One-thousandth of a Cl,lrie. Abbre-
viated mCi. 
• microcurie. One-millionth of a curie. Abbre-
viated µCi. 
• nanocurie. One-billionth of a curie. Abbre-
viated nCi. 
• picocurie. One-millionth of a microcurie. Abbre-
viated pCi; replaces the term lJ)Jc. 
A spontaneous nuclear transformation in which a par-
ticle, gamma radiation or x radiation is emitted 
following orbital electron capture of spontaneous 
fission of the nucleus. 
The mean energy imparted to matter by ionizing radia-
tion per unit mass of irradiated material at the place 
of interest. The unit of absorbed dose is the rad. 
One rad equals 0.01 Joules/kilogram in any medium (100 
ergs per gram). 
Expresses the amount of effective radiation in man, 
in rems, when modifying factors have been considered. 
The product of absorbed dose multiplied by a quality 
factor multiplied by a distribution factor. 
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Dose, occupational: 
Dose, radiation: 
Dose rate: 
Exposure: 
Half-life, radio~ 
active: 
Man-rem: 
Maximum-exposed 
individual: 
Millirad: 
Milliroentgen: 
Possession-only 
license: 
Primary coolant 
system: 
Rad: 
The exposure of an individual to radiation above back-
ground as imposed by his employment. 
As commonly used, it is the quantity of radiation ab-
sorbed in a unit mass of a medium, frequently a human 
organ. 
The radiation dose delivered per unit time and measured, 
for instance, in rems per hour. 
A measure of the ionization produced in air by x or 
gamma radiation. It is the sum of the electrical 
charges on all ions of one sign produced in air when 
all electrons liberated by photons in a volume element 
of air are completely stopped in air, divided by the 
mass of the air in the volume element. The special 
unit of exposure is the roentgen. 
The time in which half the atoms of a particular 
radioactive substance disintegrate to another nuclear 
form. Each radionuclide has a unique half-life. 
Me~sured half-lives vary from millionths of a second 
to billions of years. 
Used as a unit measure of radiation dose for a popula-
tion and calculated by summing the dose equivalent in. 
rems received by each person in the population. Also, 
it is used as the absorbed dose of one rem by one per-
son with no rate of exposure inferred. 
A hypothetical individual in the general population 
who is located at the point of highest ground-level 
concentr&tion of radioactive materials and is subject 
to the greatest concentration of the radioactive ma-
terials that are discharged from the plant. 
A unit of absorbed dose (one-thousandth of a rad). 
,A submultiple of the roentgen, equal to one-thousandth 
of a roentgen. (See roentgen.) 
A license issued to a nuclear facility owner by the 
NRC entitling-the licensee to own a nuclear facility 
but not operate it. 
The system that confines the coolant that transports 
heat from the reactor fuel to the steam generators. 
It includes the reactor vessel, pressurizer, pumps and 
piping, and the steam generators. 
The unit of absorb~d dose. The energy imparted to 
matter by ionizing radiation per unit mass of irradi-
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Radiation 
Radioactive material: 
Radioactivity: 
Radioactivity, 
induced: 
Regulatory Guides: 
Rem: 
Remote maintenance: 
ated material at the place of interest. One rad 
equals 0.01 Joules/kilogram of absorbing material. 
1) The emission and propagation of radiant energy; for 
instance, the e~ission and propagation of electromag-
netic waves, or of sound and elastic waves. 2) The 
energy propagated through space or through a mate~ial 
medium; for example, energy in the form of alpha, beta, 
and gamma emissions from radioactive nuclei. 
Any material or combination of materials which spon-
taneously emits ionizing radiation and which has a 
specific activity in excess of 0.002 microcuries per 
gram of material. (49. CFR 173.389(e) .) 
The property of certain nuclides of spontaneously 
emitting particles or gamma radiation or of emitting 
x radiation. Often shortened to "activity." 
Radioactivity produced in a substance after bombard-
ment with neutrons or other particles. The resulting 
radioactivity is "natural radioactivity" if formed by 
nuclear reactions occurring in nature, and "artificial 
radioactivity" if the reactions are caused by humans. 
Regulatory guides are issued to describe and make 
available to the public methods acceptable to the NRC 
staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's 
regulations, to delineate techniques used by the-staff 
in evaluating specific problems or postulated acci-
dents, or to provide other guidance to applicants for 
nuclear operations. Guides are not substitutes for 
regulations and compliance with them is not explicitly 
required. Methods and solutions different from those 
set out in the guides are acceptable if they provide 
a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or 
continuance of a permit or license by the NRC. 
A unit of radiation dose equivalent. "Dose equivalent" 
mearis the absorbed dose in rads multiplied by appro-
priate factors to account for differences in biological 
effectiveness (or impact) due to the quality of radia-
tion (e.g. its type and energy level) and its spatial 
distribution in the body. The term "rem" stands for 
roentgen equivalent man. (One millirem or mrem = 
0.001 rem.) 
Maintenance by remote means, i.e. the human is sep-
arated by a shielding wall from the item being main-
tained. 
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Roentgen: 
Short-lived radio-
nuclides: 
Special nuclear 
material: 
Spent fuel: 
Transuranic: 
A unit of exposure to ionizing radiation. It is that 
amount of gamma or x rays required to produce ions 
carrying one electrostatic unit of electrical charge 
(either positive or negative) in one cubic centimeter 
of dry air under standard conditions. One roentgen 
equals 2.58 x 10-4 coulombs per kilogram of air. (See 
also exposure.) 
For this study, those radioactive isotopes with half-
lives less than about ten years. 
Plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, 
and any other material as defined in 10 CFR 51 by the 
NRC. 
Nuclear fuel that has been removed from the reactor 
for disposal~ 
Transuranic elements all have atomic numbers higher 
than uranium (~hich is 92) in the periodic table. 
All are unstable, decaying radioactively, with half-
lives that range from fractions of a second to tens 
of millions of years. 
101 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHi 
Atomic Industrial Forum. An Engineering Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor 
Decommissioning Alternatives and Summary Report. Washington, D.C.: Atom-
ic Industrial Forum, Inc., 1976. 
California State Task Force on Nuclear Energy and Radioactive Materials. "Ra-
dioactive Materials in California~" Draft Report of the Secretary for 
Resources. Sacramento, California: unpublished, June 1978. 
Ewers, B.J., Jr. "Financial Evaluation of Nuclear Plant Decommissioning 
Costs." Minneapolis: unpublished, Northern States Power Co., Nov. 14, 1978. 
Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. Report to the President. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, March 1979. 
U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on the Environment and the Atmosphere. 
Committee on Science and Technology. Decommissioning and Decontamina-
tion, Hearings ••• 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977. 
U.S. Government Accounting Office. Cleaning Up the Remains of Nuclear Facil-
ities--A Multibillion Dollar Problem. Report to Congress. Washington 
D,C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1977. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technology, Safety, and Costs of Decom-
missioning a Reference Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant, NUREG-O278. Wash-
ington D.C.: National Technical Information Service, 1977. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technology, Safety, and Costs of Decom-
missioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Station, NUREG/ 
CR-O13O, Vol. I and II. Washington, D. C.: National Technical Information 
Service, 1978. (The Battelle Study.) 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormnission. Plan for Reevaluation of NRC Policy on 
Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, NUREG-0436. Washington D,C.: Nation-
al Technical Information Service, December 1978. 
103 
DecomIJ11ssioning Commercial Nuclear 
Power Plants. 
~o~y_2_ 
Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Power 
Plants. 
Copy 2 
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 
311 Walter Library 
117 Pleasant Street SE 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 
612/373-7833 
